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Abstract 
The Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) is a piece of federal legislation that was 
passed in 2004. The province of Quebec issued a reference question regarding the 
constitutionality of the federal legislation and in 2010 the Supreme Court of Canada 
rendered its opinion. The result was a success for the provinces because the Supreme 
Court’s verdict severely limited the scope of the federal legislation. In addition to 
clarifying the limits of the federal government’s criminal law power, the saga of the 
AHRA also helps illustrate the integral role the concept of co-operative federalism plays 
in modern Canadian inter-governmental relations. The nature and extent of the role 
played by co-operative federalism will be determined through an examination of 1) the 
history of co-operative federalism in Canada; 2) a discussion concerning co-operative 
federalism as a concept; 3) an examination of competitive federalism, the central 
opposing theory to co-operative federalism; 4) the development and implementation of 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act; 5) the events that occurred prior to, during, and 
after the Supreme Court ruling in 2010, and critical commentary on that decision; and 6) 
the potential implications that the Supreme Court opinion may have on future federalism 
disputes in Canada. 
Keywords  
Federalism, Biotechnology Policy, Constitutional Law, Co-Operative Federalism, 
Reproductive Technologies, Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Criminal Law Power 
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1. Introduction 
Canada is a large and geographically diverse country with a multi-cultural 
population that is constantly seeking to define its national identity. The tensions that exist 
within the Canadian Federation are fuelled by various linguistic, cultural and regional 
concerns. Due to the great size of the country the nation utilizes a variation of the federal 
system of government where legislative powers and responsibilities are divided amongst 
the central government and numerous provincial governments. Interactions between both 
levels of government are common in Canada. A specific relationship that has garnered 
significant attention is the one that exists between the federal government of Canada and 
the provincial government of Quebec. The province of Quebec has long maintained that 
the linguistic, cultural and legal structures that exist within its borders are unique in 
comparison to the other provinces, and these structures have been the source of constant 
inter-governmental tensions. As a result, Quebec has occupied a central place in the 
Canadian federalist narrative.  
That said, inter-governmental relationships in Canada have undergone drastic 
changes since Canada became a nation in 1867. From 1867 to 1930 inter-governmental 
relations in Canada were characterized as operating like ‘water-tight compartments’ 
where each individual governmental branch attended to its own business. This framework 
continued to operate until the beginning of the Great Depression and with the events 
leading up to World War II. The changing economic conditions and evolving demands of 
a modern Canadian state proved to be too demanding for each governmental jurisdiction 
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to operate in isolation from one another. Thus, in an effort to combat the strains of a 
growing nation Canadian governments began to interact with one another and more 
specifically, began to employ a concept known as co-operative federalism. Co-operative 
federalism is essentially a network of relationships that exist between different levels of 
government. These relationships are initiated and maintained by various political actors 
of the central and regional governments.1 Through these relationships mechanisms are 
developed that allow for the continuous redistribution of powers and resources without 
seeking a remedy from the courts or the amending process.2  
This project has six main sections. The first section of this project will be largely 
historical, and will consist in a review of the unique circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the Canadian Federation and analyze the influence of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, the legal institution that played a significant role in 
moulding early Canadian inter-governmental relations. In addition, the section will 
examine the status and defining characteristics of Canadian inter-governmental affairs 
before the Great Depression, and conclude with the events that triggered the shift from 
classical federalism to co-operative federalism. 
The second section will be devoted to formally introducing the concept of co-
operative federalism and discussing the views of three leading scholars whose 
perspectives assist in articulating what co-operative federalism is and the role that the 
concept has played in modern Canadian politics. The final portion of this section will be 
dedicated to briefly examining the writings of contemporary scholars regarding co-
                                                          
1
 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: 2012 Student Edition, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 
5-46. 
2
 Ibid. 
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operative federalism in an effort to solidify that the concept and its resulting mechanisms 
have endured and have become permanent fixtures in the landscape of Canadian inter-
governmental relations. 
Section three of this project will introduce and discuss the concept known as 
competitive federalism, the central opposing outlook to co-operative federalism. Once the 
competitive model of federalism has been considered, both of the concepts will be 
compared and contrasted to one another. Key similarities and differences will be 
uncovered to demonstrate the uses of both concepts and to clarify that co-operative 
federalism is the best alternative to judicial review.    
To adequately illustrate the uses of co-operative federalism the saga of a contested 
piece of federal legislation called the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004),3 will be 
examined. In particular section four will centre upon the genesis of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act including an analysis of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies,4 the drafting of the legislation, and a brief overview of the provisions 
contained within the Act. Once the provisions of the Act have been outlined general 
observations pertaining to the legislation will be highlighted along with a short 
examination of the legislative landscape prior to the creation of the Act. 
The fifth section of this paper will explore the saga of litigation that occurred as a 
result of the Government of Quebec issuing a reference question to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal regarding the constitutionality of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act. A 
                                                          
3
 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ESC 2004, c 2. 
4
 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1993) [Proceed 
with Care]. 
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concise summary of the jurisprudence related to the federal government’s criminal law 
power and the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights will be provided in 
order to comprehend the legal arguments put forth in the Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (2010)5. Also, the three opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada will 
be explored followed by a critical commentary on the reference case, which will include 
the views of legal scholars in relation to the reference opinion.  
The final section will be dedicated to discussing the potential implications of the 
majority opinion in the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act and presenting 
concluding thoughts pertaining to the possible effects co-operative federalism can have 
on the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, subsequent Canadian policy initiatives and 
future constitutional disputes.   
Overall, the objective of this thesis is to examine co-operative federalism as the 
ideal alternative to judicial review, one that appeals to the idea that the judiciary should 
only be considered as a ‘fail-safe’ mechanism for governments, if prolonged inter-
governmental negotiations are unsuccessful. In particular, I will defend the proposition 
that greater inter-governmental negotiation and consultation concerning the creation of 
policy, especially complex policy with constitutional implications, will result in 
legislation that is less likely to be challenged in the judiciary. In other words, co-
operative federalism will be presented and defended as the best way to manage inter-
governmental tensions in the Canadian federation as it is currently structured. 
 
                                                          
5
 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457. 
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2. Historical Background 
2.1 Canada Before the Great Depression 
To begin, a brief introduction to the history and development of co-operative 
federalism is necessary. There were a series of factors that assisted in the negotiating, 
drafting and signing of the British North America Act, 1867.6 By 1864 it was clear that 
the industrial North in the United States had won the American Civil War and would 
consolidate the Southern states back into the American union.7 Due to the strained 
diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States, the Canadian colonies now 
had a very unfriendly and powerful opponent to the south. Before these events Britain 
was against the idea of Canadian Confederation but in order to secure a strong military 
base within its remaining colonies in North America, the British government was forced 
to change its position.8  Within Canada, each eventual participant in Confederation had 
their own concerns about federalism, but in the end they accepted that forming a 
federation would create stability.  It was the intention of the original drafters of the 
Canadian Constitution to have the numerous provincial governments bound by a strong 
central governmental branch. The newly created central government would handle 
matters of national concern while the provincial governments would possess the powers 
required to effectively manage local and regional matters.  Along with national security, 
trade was of particular importance to the economic state of all the colonies that would 
                                                          
6
 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. 
7
 Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2004) at 24. 
8
 Ibid at 26. 
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comprise Canada in 1867. The idea that there would be no tariffs applied to inter-
provincial Canadian trade was extremely appealing, particularly because the United 
States had terminated a long standing reciprocal trade agreement with the Canadian 
British colonies in 1866.9 Nevertheless, Canada was formed into a sovereign nation due 
to the various colonies entering into the agreement known as the British North America 
Act (BNA Act), subsequently referred to as Constitution Act, 1867 after 1982, which 
culminated in Confederation in 1867. 
The unique society and culture that had been fighting for survival within the 
borders of Quebec ever since the Conquest of 1759 was the driving force in negotiations 
leading up to the formation of the Canadian Federation in 1867. As noted by Stevenson, 
“The demands for provincial legislative powers came mainly from the French Canadians, 
for whom the establishment of a Quebec legislature was the major attraction of 
Confederation.”10 The powers that Quebec wanted control over were related to education, 
the legal system, and the family. Even the prominent provincial jurisdiction of ‘property 
and civil rights’, located in section 92 (13) of the BNA Act, 1867 that numerous 
constitutional disputes have been decided upon was expressly designed to protect 
Quebec’s distinctive legal system, “… by repeating a phrase first used in the Quebec Act 
of 1774…”11 It was the demands of French Canada that significantly influenced how the 
provincial and federal powers were going to be distributed in sections 91 and 92 of the 
original British North America Act, 1867. 
                                                          
9
 Stevenson, supra note 7 at 27. 
10
 Ibid at 29. 
11
 Ibid. 
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 Canada’s first Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald had a particular version of 
federalism in mind when he and his associates were negotiating and drafting the 
Canadian Constitution. It was clear that Macdonald’s concept of federalism accepted that 
provincial interests were important and legitimate. However, these provincial worries 
were seen as less important than the national goals of the federal government.12 
Macdonald also believed that provincial concerns were not represented exclusively by the 
provincial governments. Seeing as the federal government represented all of the pressing 
provincial matters it seemed obvious that both levels of government shared responsibility 
in highlighting provincial issues.13 The federal government was responsible for ensuring 
regional concerns were addressed so that in turn, the entire nation could flourish. The 
implications of Macdonald’s perspectives are clear, the federal government represented 
national interests as well as a portion of matters of particular provincial and local 
importance. If this was true than provincial governments were only responsible for 
matters of provincial and local nature that were not represented by the federal 
government. While it seemed that Sir John A. Macdonald’s conception of federalism did 
not consider both levels of government as equal, this notion disappeared when 
constitutional disputes were brought to the attention of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC). 
2.2 The Influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
 The institution that shaped the future of Canadian inter-governmental politics was 
not an establishment based in Canada but rather one that operated out of England. The 
                                                          
12
 Stevenson, supra note 7 at 35. 
13
 Ibid at 36. 
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JCPC was the final court of appeal for Canada from 1867 until 1949.14 Due to the 
existence of the JCPC, the creation of a Canadian “general court of appeal” was not seen 
as a necessity and this explains why the Supreme Court of Canada was not created until 
1875.15  The creation of the Supreme Court of Canada was fundamentally different from 
the establishment of the Supreme Court in the United States. The Canadian Supreme 
Court was created by the passing of an ordinary statute the Supreme Court Act, 1875, 
unlike in the United States where the U.S. Supreme Court and its powers are entrenched 
within the U.S. Constitution. Due to the presence of the JCPC, the final rulings over 
federal-provincial disputes were not being determined by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
As stated by Hausegger et al. “Even After 1875, it was possible to bypass the Supreme 
Court and appeal directly… to the JCPC…”16 The Supreme Court of Canada did not 
become Canada’s final court of appeal until 1949. Consequently, the subservient stature 
of the Supreme Court of Canada before 1949 allowed for the JCPC to mould provincial 
and federal relations into a form that was far different from the concept put forth by the 
Fathers of Confederation.  
The law lords that comprised the JCPC singlehandedly decentralized trends in 
Canadian public life. This can be explained by highlighting that at this time British legal 
practitioners subscribed to the view that “checks and balances” were beneficial to a 
federal state.17 In essence the dominant legal outlook took seriously the significance of 
                                                          
14
 Lori Hausegger et al. Canadian Courts: Law, Politics and Process (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 56. 
15
 Stevenson, supra note 7 at 46. 
16
 Hausegger et al. supra note 14 at 56-57. 
17
 Dennis Baker, Not Quite Supreme: The Courts and Coordinate Constitutional Interpretation (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University press, 2010) at 65-66. 
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jurisdictional separation.18 This legal attitude was demonstrated by the JCPC when the 
court provided a narrow interpretation of the “peace, order and good government” clause 
that was found in the Constitution of 1867 and a more generous interpretation regarding 
provincial jurisdiction over property and civil matters.19 As time passed, “…this literal… 
understanding of legal formalities was displaced by a focus on empirical realities that 
were simply not captured by descriptions of the formalities.”20 As Canadian political 
culture matured into the 1900’s it was clear that essential institutional actors, such as 
parties and cabinets, were never mentioned in constitutional documents. This is 
interesting because many fundamental political actors within Canadian politics today are 
not included in constitutional documents but are instead products of constitutional 
convention. This speaks to the flexibility of Canadian federalism and is evidence that the 
country does not operate exactly as described in the Canadian Constitution. This lends to 
the legitimacy of co-operative federalism as an alternative to judicial review in disputes 
concerning federalism because, although the Constitution Act, 1867 makes no mention of 
inter-governmental co-operative structures, the Canadian state is capable of introducing 
new constitutional concepts without express constitutional declarations. Furthermore, 
inter-governmental relationships depend upon informal agreements which have no 
foundation in the Constitution, statutes or conventions.21 One example of such 
arrangements is first ministers’ conferences, which are conferences involving the 
provincial Premiers and the federal Prime Minister. With the support of senior ministers 
                                                          
18
 Baker, supra note 17 at 66. 
19
 Herman Bakvis et al. Contested Federalism: Certainty and Ambiguity in the Canadian Federation 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 31. 
20
 Baker, supra note 17 at 66. 
21
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46. 
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and officials, the First Ministers are in a position to make commitments on behalf of 
government, including commitments that require legislative action.22  
2.3 The Shift to Co-Operative Federalism 
 The structure of governmental politics and division of powers that was established 
with the constitutional interpretation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
operated effectively until the first worldwide economic meltdown. The Great Depression 
of the 1930’s tested the financial capabilities of all the provinces and exposed the fiscal 
limitations of the provincial governments.23 Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett 
attempted to introduce legislation that was inspired by the New Deal, which was a piece 
of legislation implemented in the United States to combat the effects of the Depression. 
Unfortunately a number of the measures were rejected by the JCPC because in its view 
the contingencies went beyond the federal government’s jurisdiction.24 By 1938, the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission25 was appointed to analyze the financial implications of the 
Great Depression. The Commission recommended major changes to the current 
distribution of powers and a greater centralization of fiscal power in Ottawa.26 The 
official report of the Commission was not released until 1940 and when it was finally 
unveiled it was vehemently opposed by the three most populated and richest provinces.27 
However, it was clear that the provinces did not have the required financial resources to 
counter-act the effects of a worldwide economic crisis.  
                                                          
22
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46. 
23
 Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 31. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1940) [Rowell-Sirois Report].  
26
 Ibid at 32.  
27
 Ibid. 
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 The beginning of the Second World War and the re-introduction of a wartime 
economy initiated the construction of the Canadian social welfare state. A period of 
federal dominance during the World War II introduced the era of co-operative federalism. 
Co-operative federalism was a system of relationships amongst the governmental leaders 
of the federal and provincial governments.28  Utilizing co-operative federalism, “fiscally 
and politically strong provincial governments and a national government armed with a 
potent spending power created social programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction…”29 
Some of the new social programs related to healthcare, post-secondary education, and 
social assistance.30 The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was one of the social programs that 
flawlessly sourced the tenets of co-operative federalism and produced a framework that 
continues to benefit all Canadians. Throughout the process of creating the CPP the two 
orders of government worked in such an intimate fashion to construct the agreement, that 
the final version included a provision that required a specified number of provincial 
governments as well as Ottawa to approve any future changes to the CPP.31 
Additionally, after the war Ottawa took control over a number of tax fields and it 
became evident that there was a need to improve linkages between the east and the west. 
Two examples of such linkages include the construction of the Trans- Canada highway 
and the creation of natural gas and oil pipelines from western Canada to supply central 
Canadian markets.32 Finally, the social and economic devastation of the Great Depression 
served as the primary motivation to create the national social safety net. The areas 
                                                          
28
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-46. 
29
 Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, Canadian Federalism, 3d ed (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2012) at 6. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid at 32. 
32
 Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 32. 
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required to create an effective welfare system were largely within provincial jurisdiction 
but it was evident that Ottawa had the motivation and the necessary monetary resources 
to implement the framework successfully.33 The federal government needed the 
assistance of the provinces seeing as they were responsible for health and welfare 
matters. It was from this point forward that new relationships emerged between the 
provincial and federal government. New consultative structures developed between the 
elected officials of both levels of government and these structures have remained in place 
ever since.34 The emergence of co-operative federalism was facilitated by various 
Supreme Court verdicts that made it possible for one level of government to wilfully 
delegate an authority to an agency of another order of government.35 An example of such 
an agency is the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA).36 The legislative package 
that created CEMA constituted a solution worked out, through federal-provincial co-
operation, to address the problems of regulating the marketing of agricultural products.37 
The legislation and companion agreement signed by the federal government and all ten 
provincial governments, established a comprehensive program for the regulation and 
marketing of eggs in Canada.38 Finally, the co-operative nature of Canadian federalism 
was enhanced when beginning in the 1920’s the Supreme Court began to provide a more 
liberal interpretation of ‘peace, order and good government’.39 The peace, order and good 
government clause in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 was interpreted as enabling 
                                                          
33
 Jennifer Smith, Federalism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) at 22. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 33. 
36
 Patrick Macklem & Carol Rogerson, eds, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications Limited, 2010) at 365. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 33. 
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Ottawa to enact legislation that might otherwise come within provincial jurisdiction.40 As 
established in Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press (1923)41 and 
subsequently in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider (1925),42 it can do so 
temporarily and quite extensively in order to respond to emergency situations.43 Also, 
Parliament has the authority to justify permanent legislation in circumstances involving 
provincial authority if the matter has attained a sufficient ‘national concern’ or ‘national 
dimension’ such as aeronautics and the national capital region.44 Overall, the post-war era 
marked the end of an age that was characterized by the jurisdictions of the provinces and 
federal government as being separated like water-tight compartments. 
3. Co-Operative Federalism 
The creation of the federal system in Canada was a political compromise between 
proponents of national unity and proponents of diversity.45 In a country that spans such a 
vast territory it is appropriate to have a federal governmental system in place. However, 
due to the distinct regional identities that exist across the country it would be difficult for 
the federal government to efficiently operate and adequately represent countless concerns 
at the provincial and local levels. Therefore the federal shape of Canada dictates that the 
national government is responsible for all matters of national importance and that the 
                                                          
40
 Dave Snow & Rainer Knopff, “Assisted Reproduction Policy in Federal States: What Canada Should 
Learn from Australia” (2012) 5 University of Calgary: The School of Public Policy, SPP Research Papers 1 
at 7. 
41
 Fort Frances Pulp & Paper v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] AC 695. 
42
 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] AC 396. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 17-31. 
45
 Ibid at 5-14. 
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provincial governments ensure that matters of local importance are safeguarded.46  
Essentially, “… the federal imperative is that territorially-bounded interests be given a 
strong influence in the governmental process.”47  
Due to the federal composition of the Canadian state, different levels of 
government exist to represent and protect particular interests. The period in Canadian 
governmental history prior to World War II is characterized as a time when different 
levels of Canadian government behaved like ‘watertight compartments’.48 This 
‘watertight compartment’ notion of federalism views each branch of government as 
operating on its own and rarely over-lapping with another level of government.49 
According to academics like Peter W. Hogg, Donald V. Smiley, W.R. Lederman, Richard 
Simeon, Ian Robinson and Ronald L. Watts, this type of governmental behaviour went 
against the fundamental goals of the Canadian federal system. Smiley explains that “The 
constitutional distribution of powers between Parliament and the provinces underlies a 
situation in which the two orders of government are highly interdependent…”50 Since the 
Constitution bestows explicit powers upon particular levels of government, it is necessary 
for the provincial and federal governments to interact. Scholars advocating for the 
existence of effective Canadian federalism state that “… a continuous process of federal-
provincial consultation and negotiation is at the heart of the Canadian federal system.”51 
It is critical that co-operative relationships exist between various governmental 
                                                          
46
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-14.1. 
47
 Donald V. Smiley. The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 84 
[Smiley, “Federal Condition”].  
48
 Bakvis et al. supra note 19 at 6. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Smiley, “Federal Condition”, supra note 47 at 85-86. 
51
 Ibid at 86. 
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components of the Canadian legislative structure to ensure that the system operates 
smoothly and efficiently while minimizing inter-governmental tensions. 
The formal structure of the Canadian Constitution suggests that eleven legislative 
bodies are confined to separate jurisdictions and that each of these entities act 
independently of the others.52 In addition, the Constitution does not take into account the 
political implications of the three territorial governments, along with the influence of the 
numerous Aboriginals bands that still exist today. Nevertheless, in many fields effective 
policies require joint actions between numerous legislative bodies. The reality of the 
modern Canadian Federation is that all levels of government are interdependent. As Peter 
W. Hogg explains, “The related demands of interdependence of governmental policies, 
equalization of regional disparities, and constitutional adaptation have combined to 
produce what is generally described as “cooperative federalism”.”53 Co-operative 
federalism is described as a system of relationships between various political actors that 
allow for the continuous reallocation of responsibilities and resources without appeals to 
the courts or a need to utilize the amending process.54 These relationships encourage 
consultations to occur on issues that are important to the federal and provincial 
governments.55 It is essential that these relationships remain as they assist in the 
development of policies and agreements that are beneficial for all Canadians. 
The creation of the Canadian Federation was the result of an agreement of mutual 
consent between parties that supported both unification and diversity. Tensions are 
                                                          
52
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45. 
53
 W.R. Lederman, “Some Forms and Limitations of Co-Operative Federalism” in W.R. Lederman, ed, 
Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional History, Public Law and 
Federal System of Canada (Toronto: Butterworth, 1981) at 315. 
54
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45, 5-46. 
55
 Lederman, supra note 53 at 315. 
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inherent within any federal system because the powers of government are distributed 
between a national government and other local governmental bodies. However, one of the 
distinct advantages of having a federal system in place is that this type of governmental 
organization is highly adaptable. When the Canadian Federation was formed in 1867, it 
was common for disputes related to jurisdiction to be brought to the attention of the 
judiciary. There was little consultation and negotiation occurring between the federal 
government and the provincial governments. This era of inter-governmental relations in 
Canada between 1867 and 1930 has often been described as a time when governments 
acted like ‘watertight compartments’. Prior to 1930, very little had been written on the 
subject of Canadian federalism.56 As the Great Depression continued to affect the 
economic stability of the country, it was clear that the current operation of Canadian 
federalism had been inadequate in meeting the demands of the Canadian population.57 
Both levels of government could no longer afford to bicker amongst one another and wait 
for the courts to render decisions concerning jurisdiction and the allocation of resources. 
The governmental bodies in Canada needed to establish a new framework that would 
solve inter-governmental disputes, without litigation within the courts and without the 
pursuit of constitutional amendment. To address the pressing concerns of the country, 
Canadian legislatures began to employ the concept of co-operative federalism. In what 
follows the views of constitutional law experts Peter W. Hogg, W.R. Lederman and 
Donald V. Smiley will be considered to illustrate the important role that co-operative 
federalism plays in the modern Canadian Federation. Above all, co-operative federalism 
will be discussed as the best alternative to judicial review particularly in cases concerning 
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federalism, and that the judiciary should only be involved if extended inter-governmental 
relations fail to provide a viable solution. 
3.1 The End of the Classical Federalism Era 
The structure of Canadian governmental institutions and the division of powers 
that occurred with the judicial opinions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
lasted until the beginning of the first stock market crash in 1929. The Great Depression of 
the 1930’s revealed that the provinces could not mitigate the effects of this crisis alone.58 
Canadian Prime Minister R.B. Bennett attempted to pass federal regulations that would 
combat the economic conditions. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation did not survive 
the scrutiny of the JCPC and the established division of powers.59 The failure of Prime 
Minister Bennett’s legislation led many to believe that the Canadian Constitution did not 
allow the federal government to adequately address the issues of the day.60 
In response, the federal government appointed the Royal Commission on 
Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1938.61 The Commission, also known as the Rowell-
Sirois Report, “… published in 1940, constitutes, along with the specialized studies 
undertaken at the direction of the Commission, the most comprehensive study of a 
working federal system that has ever been made.”62 The Commission was ordered to 
analyze the current state of federalism in Canada and review the entire financial structure 
of the federation. The final report recommended greater centralization of powers to the 
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federal government and greater fiscal controls transferred to Ottawa.63 It was clear that 
the report was highly critical of collaborative activities between the federal and provincial 
governments. However, the Rowell-Sirois Report seriously underestimated the future 
possibilities of federal-provincial co-operation.64 
Overall, the post-war era marked the end of the age of ‘classical federalism’. This 
‘classical federalism’ period has been described by academics as a time when the 
jurisdictions of the provinces and federal government were completely separated as if 
each jurisdiction was a ‘water-tight compartment.’ Canadian constitutional scholar Peter 
H. Russell observed that: 
“This so-called “co-operative federalism” of the post-war period has been much 
less a litigious struggle between Ottawa and the provinces to defend and expand 
their own enclaves of power than a matter of political compromise and 
administrative pragmatism.”65 
 This concludes my discussion of the genesis of the concept of co-operative 
federalism. The next portion of this project will be dedicated to introducing the views of 
three Canadian constitutional law scholars who define what co-operative federalism is, 
and articulate the impact the concept has had on modern Canadian inter-governmental 
relations. It is important to consider the perspectives of these scholars especially when 
one is attempting to understand what co-operative federalism is and how the model 
applies to actual legal and political situations.   
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3.2 Peter W. Hogg and Co-Operative Federalism 
Since the mid 1940’s co-operative federalism has been a concept utilized by 
Canadian governmental institutions. Canadian constitutional law expert Peter W. Hogg 
has written about the countless benefits of co-operative federalism within the context of 
the Canadian Federation. Hogg explains that the formal structure of the Constitution 
seems to describe the existence of eleven separate legislative bodies that operate 
independently of one another.66 In certain fields this is exactly what happens. However, 
mechanisms such as equalization grants demonstrate that this is not always the case. For 
example, the equalization grants were created to account for regional economic 
disparities. The prosperous provinces are required to assist the poorer provinces in order 
to help maintain a minimum national average for public services across the country.67  
Over time, changing conditions require the federal system to evolve and adapt in 
order to survive.68 For a federation to keep pace with the shifting values and expectations 
of modern society it is necessary to modify the Constitution. Constitutional adaptation 
can occur through the courts, constitutional amendment or inter-governmental co-
operation.69 First, change through recourse to the courts is time consuming and 
incremental. The courts can only render decisions based upon the cases that come to the 
attention of the judiciary. Also, it is recognized that there is a significant delay between 
when cases reach the bench of the Supreme Court and when the Court releases a decision. 
Next, adaptation within the federal system does not ordinarily occur through 
constitutional amendment, as this process is highly demanding and lengthy. The 
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amending process instituted by the Constitution Act, 1982  “…require(s) such a broad 
consensus for most amendments that they cannot be a regular form of adaptation.”70 
Hogg concludes that since adaptation through the courts is incremental and constitutional 
amendment is extremely demanding, the efficient operation of the modern Canadian state 
demands a significant degree of co-operation. Examples of co-operation between 
governments include interdependence of government policies, equalization of regional 
disparities and constitutional adaptation. In Canadian academic literature, co-operation 
between governments has been identified as co-operative federalism.  
The essence of co-operative federalism is a network of relationships that exist 
between various executives and public representatives of the central and provincial 
governments.71 Through these relationships mechanisms are created, “…which allow a 
continuous redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts or the 
amending process.”72 Most inter-governmental relationships depend on informal 
arrangements between different governmental bodies. These informal measures have no 
basis in the Constitution, statutes or constitutional convention.73 There are numerous 
federal-provincial committees of ministers that meet on occasion.74 Similarly, there are 
frequent meetings between bureaucratic officials of both levels of government and 
countless organizations, committees and conferences involved in the inter-governmental 
                                                          
70
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-45. 
71
 Ibid at 5-46. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Ibid at 5-47.  
74
 Ibid. 
21 
 
liaison.75  It is clear that vast arrays of consultative organisms are operating within the 
Canadian Federation.76 
3.3 W.R. Lederman’s View of Co-operative Federalism 
Canadian constitutional scholar W.R. Lederman wrote extensively on issues 
related to the Canadian Constitution. Lederman wrote that all federal systems must 
employ co-operative federalism to some degree.77 He observed that in Canada, there is 
the increasing need for agreements and understandings between the federal and 
provincial governments. For both levels of government to operate efficiently it is 
important for there to be clarification concerning specified uses of respective powers and 
resources.78 These agreements and understandings take many forms, operate in many 
ways and occur at every official level. Co-operation within the Canadian governmental 
system is ongoing and occurs on a regular basis.  
It is clear that these consultations are not simply a measure of good will and that 
hard bargaining is expected. Such negotiations occur within the framework provided by 
the federal Constitution. The Constitution is important because it provides the initial 
definition of which powers and resources are to be wielded by both levels of government. 
Essentially, the Constitution provides the framework of how co-operative measures 
between governments in Canada will be undertaken.79 Lederman stresses that the courts 
play an important role in the operation of co-operative federalism. Interpretations of the 
Constitution that are supplied by the judiciary are important because it is these 
                                                          
75
 Hogg, supra note 1 at 5-47. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Lederman, supra note 53 at 314. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Ibid. 
22 
 
explanations that inform the jurisdictional underpinnings of the Canadian federal system. 
The bargaining position of each respective level of government is determined by legal 
interpretation.80 
The federal system of government divides legislative powers amongst different 
levels of government. However, the federal government and the provinces are responsible 
for the same population living in the same territory. Thus, this division of power implies 
a certain level of government interdependence.81 Both governments have a joint 
responsibility to the same territory and the same people but are limited to a specific list of 
powers. In the Canadian context inter-governmental co-operative measures are desirable 
because, both the federal and provincial legislatures need to respond to the wishes of the 
same electoral bodies residing in the same territory.82 If the federal and provincial lists of 
power were clear, complete and mutually exclusive in all circumstances, then there would 
be no need for co-operative federalism.83  The employment of co-operative federalism is 
a necessity in Canada today. In modern Canadian society, statutes have become more 
complicated and multi-faceted. The more complex a statute, the greater need there is for 
inter-governmental collaboration.  
In sum, Lederman demonstrates that the federal and provincial governments are 
constantly involved with one and another. Based on the division of powers stipulated in 
the Constitution governments in Canada have always been dependent. Inter-governmental 
conferences, committees and meetings are a permanent fixture of modern Canadian 
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federalism.84 Lederman explained that the presence of wide-ranging co-operative activity 
is a sign of health and vitality within the Canadian federal system.85 Moreover, co-
operative federalism contains elements of efficiency and flexibility that will allow the 
Canadian Federation to adapt and change over time.86 The widespread use of the concept 
has demonstrated that co-operative federalism allows governments to address the 
changing needs of Canadian society with far greater effectiveness, as opposed to if the 
legislatures appealed to the courts or constitutional amendment.  
3.4 Donald V. Smiley and Co-Operative Federalism 
Canada’s premier federalism scholar Donald V. Smiley has published numerous 
works pertaining to the history and development of the Canadian Federation. Smiley 
stated that the goal of any federal system is to safeguard regional interests and to ensure 
that these interests are given strong influence in the governmental process.87 Due to the 
presence of a federal system in Canada, “… the constitutional distribution of 
powers…underlies a situation in which the two orders of government are highly 
interdependent but are not directly related to one another…”88 For Smiley, a continuous 
process of federal-provincial consultation and negotiation is at the very heart of the 
Canadian federal system.89  
Within the academic community, co-operative federalism has been described as 
an effective mechanism for creating arrangements between governments that are 
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beneficial to all Canadians. Smiley emphasized collaboration between governments as 
opposed to ‘classical federalism’, where each level of government fulfilled constitutional 
duties in relative isolation from one another.90 As Canada’s foremost student in the field 
of federalism, Smiley sought to describe the features that embody the concept of co-
operative federalism. First, co-operative federalism envisages an increasingly more 
institutionalized framework for inter-governmental relations. These structures would 
encourage regular meetings between government officials and greater transparency 
regarding the activities performed during these consultations.91 Second, co-operative 
federalism involves interactions between the federal and provincial governments 
concerning the most fundamental aspects of public policy.92 With the increasing 
complexity of modern legislation, co-ordination and consultation between governments is 
essential to ensure tensions within the federation are at a minimum. Furthermore, in areas 
that could have not been foreseen at the time of Confederation, such as environmental 
law and advances in health technology, collaboration is necessary because the 
Constitution is silent concerning these emerging fields. The third feature is directly 
related to the second. Co-operative federalism endorses consultation between 
governments prior to the commitment to new policies that may infringe on the 
jurisdiction of the other.93 It was not uncommon for the federal government to act 
unilaterally in areas related to provincial jurisdiction shortly after the Second World 
War.94 The 1950’s were considered to be the height of this aforementioned federal 
dominance. However, co-operative federalism precludes any unilateral legislative 
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action.95 The Quebec Premier Jean Lesage at the Federal-Provincial Conference stressed 
this understanding in July 1965 when he stated:  
“Sound practice of federalism requires that each government respect the 
jurisdiction of the other legislative authorities. In an era when interdependence is 
as pronounced as it is today…even when legislating in fields within its own 
jurisdiction, each government should be concerned with the repercussions of its 
decisions on the others’ plans and the orderly conduct of the country’s affairs in 
general.”96 
The final feature of co-operative federalism is the most crucial to the successful 
application of the concept. The way in which governments continuously redistribute 
powers, responsibilities and resources amongst one another is through constant 
interaction between the federal and provincial government rather than constitutional 
amendment or changing patterns of judicial review.97 The Honourable Guy Favreau 
accurately described the new circumstances surrounding post-war Canadian federalism 
when he stated, “Gone are the days when constant recourse to the courts was hurriedly 
made to obtain an interpretation that would finally resolve jurisdictional conflicts 
between the federal and provincial governments.”98 Most of the basic conflicts between 
the two levels no longer require the involvement of the judiciary. Constitutional 
amendment is demanding and changes to constitutional documents simply delineate 
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powers and privileges rather than articulating specific activities.99 Under the prevailing 
attitudes it would be regarded as inappropriate for the governments to submit a dispute of 
fundamental importance to the judiciary unless extensive inter-governmental negotiations 
had failed to result in an agreement.100 
3.5 Other Contemporary Thoughts on Co-Operative Federalism 
Recent writings on the concept suggest that co-operative federalism has had a 
profound impact on Canadian governance. There is a general consensus within the 
academic community that “well-performing federal institutions… [are] conducive to 
negotiation, consultation, or simply an exchange of information.”101 Given the changing 
policy environment and continually shifting agendas, governments need to interact with 
one another and communicate to adjust their respective roles. 102 In a federal system, 
producing results for the population means reaching agreements on a variety of issues. In 
general, “Canadians have no deep commitment to the principle of federalism, have little 
knowledge of the existing division of powers, and care little about which government 
exercises which power.”103 Nevertheless, Canadians care about results and they view co-
operation between governments as the best way to achieve this.104 As mentioned, the 
development of negotiation and coordination between both levels of government 
occurred after the conclusion of World War II. Together, the provinces and federal 
government coordinated to create social programs within provincial jurisdiction that 
would benefit all Canadians. Modern scholars have reported that co-operative federalism 
                                                          
99
 Smiley, “Constitutional”, supra note 56 at 82. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Bakvis & Skogstad, supra note 29 at 4. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 Ibid at 17. 
104
 Ibid. 
27 
 
has evolved into a less hierarchical form since the 1990’s.105 The dedication to co-
operative federalism has allowed Canada to become one of the world’s most 
decentralized federations, with the federal and provincial governments relatively evenly 
balanced in their power and status and at the same time highly inter-dependent.106   
The influence that co-operative federalism has had on Canadian inter-
governmental relations is undeniable. The writings of Peter W. Hogg, W.R. Lederman, 
Donald V. Smiley and other more recent research clearly indicate that co-operative 
federalism is an indispensable feature of a healthy Canadian federal system. The 
utilization of the concept has demonstrated that co-operative federalism has allowed the 
Canadian federation to survive and flourish. The defining characteristic of co-operative 
federalism is for political and administrative processes to be the chief instruments of 
change.107 The flexibility and efficiency of the modern Canadian state relies on the 
existence of ongoing negotiation and collaboration between the federal and provincial 
governments. Bringing disagreements to the attention of the courts should only be 
considered as a ‘fail-safe’ mechanism in the rare event of an irreconcilable 
misunderstanding between governments. The use of the judiciary as an absolute last 
resort is widely accepted within the academic community. All collaborative resources 
that are accessible within the modern inter-governmental framework must be exhausted 
before a disagreement is brought to the attention of the judiciary. 
The concept of co-operative federalism reflects the flexibility and efficient 
operation of Canadian federalism. The ending of the classical federalism era 
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demonstrated that Canadian federalism has the ability to adapt. No longer were 
governments operating as if they were in seclusion from one another, the demands of a 
mature Canada necessitated modifications.  The introduction of co-operative federalism 
laid the foundation for the current inter-governmental mechanisms that exist to this day. 
The fact that contemporary political scientists and constitutional law scholars continue to 
discuss the impact of the concept suggests that the concept is influential in the field of 
inter-governmental relations. The continuous discussion of the concept in academic 
literature indicates co-operative federalism is irreplaceable in the attempt to minimize 
tensions within the Canadian Federation. Additionally, adhering to the tenets of co-
operative federalism has the potential to not only decrease tensions but can also allow for 
the creation of legislation that it is accepted by both the federal and provincial 
governments. 
4. Competitive Federalism 
 It is clear that in the mid-1930’s and following the conclusion of World War II, 
federalism within the Canadian Federation adapted to the changing social and economic 
concerns of 20th century Canada. According to leading Canadian constitutional scholars 
the use of co-operative federalism resulted in increased co-ordination between 
governments that allowed for the establishment of the Canadian welfare state.108 
However, when performing an analysis concerning the effectiveness of co-operative 
federalism it is important to consider differing perspectives. The central opposing theory 
to the notion of co-operative federalism is a concept known as competitive federalism. 
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Canadian economist Albert Breton first postulated the formal theory of 
competitive federalism. Breton wrote an article in early 1985 as a criticism of some 
recommendations contained in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic 
Union and Development Prospects for Canada.109 In the article, Breton outlined his 
theory of competitive federalism that questioned the operation of co-operative federalism. 
Breton began by highlighting that there was a tendency within the academic literature to 
compare the Canadian federal system with the political infrastructures of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. He explained that each of these modern nations operated 
while utilizing distinct forms of political organization. For example, the United Kingdom 
is a unitary-parliamentary state, the United States is a federal-congressional state and 
Canada is a federal-parliamentary state.110 Unlike the federal states of Canada and the 
United States, the United Kingdom does not have to worry about division of powers 
disputes because of the unitary structure it employs. Breton made the distinction between 
the three nations to emphasize that Canada was the first country to employ the federal-
parliamentary style of state organization. He explained that since then numerous federal 
countries have chosen to incorporate Canada’s combination of the parliamentary and 
federal systems.111  
Although Canadian federalism had survived for almost 150 years, Breton 
disagreed with how the system had evolved and adapted since the 1930’s. He stressed the 
need for increased competition within the Canadian Federation and added that 
competition would increase the effectiveness of federalism in Canada. In particular, 
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Breton claimed that increased competition could be introduced by changing the Canadian 
political system to include additional checks and balances.112 According to Breton, little 
competition, or few checks and balances, exist within the parliamentary system of 
government. In his view the checks and balances that are present within the Canadian 
political system stem from powerful interests such as “…economic (like business and 
labour, though these are not usually of equal strength), religious (churches), intellectual 
(academics and research organizations), and so on.”113 Other checks and balances come 
from Question Period in the House of Commons and more importantly, the competition 
that originates from the political necessity to garner public support that is contested at 
regular intervals.114 However, Breton was of the view that, overall inter-governmental 
competition is rather weak, especially when the political party in power has obtained a 
majority government.115 
Breton explained that the shortage of checks and balances in the Canadian 
political structure originated from the lack of separation between the executive and 
legislative branches.116 According to renowned federalism scholar Ronald L. Watts:  
“The most innovative feature of the [Canadian] federation was that, in contrast to 
the U.S. and Swiss federations, which emphasized the separation of the executive 
and legislature in their federal institutions, Canada was the first federation to 
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incorporate a system of parliamentary responsible government in which the 
executive and the legislature are fused.”117 
With decreased checks and balances the aspirations and opinions of the public are not 
likely to be richly represented, as they would be in a system with a larger amount of 
competition.118  Breton stressed that the solution lied in the proven adaptability of 
Canadian federalism. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada presented recommendations that had the potential of 
improving inter-governmental competition, such as making suggestions pertaining to 
Senate reform. Breton sought to go one step further when he suggested, “… serious 
consideration should be given to finding ways of reducing party discipline… for all 
matters, except budgetary ones.”119 The logic behind this proposal was to increase the 
power of individual elected representatives and in turn, enhance the minister’s capability 
to voice the opinions of their constituents, which would improve a voter’s ability to 
influence government. 
 The heart of Breton’s argument is steeped in the idea of Canadian intra-
governmental competition. What Breton meant by ‘intra-governmental competition’ was 
the competition that occurred between various political parties, the executive, the 
legislature, the judiciary and bureaucracies.120 These various components of the Canadian 
political system are constantly competing for popular support. In Breton’s view, popular 
support is “… something that is as needed for the effectiveness of governing parties as 
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revenue is essential for the effectiveness of business firms.”121 In other words, it is 
essential for the effective operation of the Canadian Federation for various political 
entities to compete with one another with the goal of maximizing public support.  
4.1 Breton’s Criticism of Co-Operative Federalism 
 With this notion of competition in mind, Breton examined the effectiveness of co-
operative federalism within the context of Canadian federalism. Breton stated that “it 
must be recognized that co-operative federalism is aimed at removing the competition 
which is a natural by-product of federal organization.”122 In some cases it is beneficial for 
competitive relationships to remain in place, such as the adversarial relationship between 
prosecutors and defense attorneys in a court of law, and the competitive nature of various 
political parties vying for public support in electoral contests. These examples underline 
that in some cases co-operation is a less efficient alternative to a competitive 
environment. Breton was clear when he warned, “… co-operation can easily degenerate 
into collusion, conspiracy and connivance and that this is not necessarily good!”123 The 
collusion that Breton referred to was reflected in the operation of co-operative federalism, 
which Breton declared was the same as executive federalism. Renowned Canadian 
federalism scholar Donald V. Smiley defined executive federalism as, “… the relations 
between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in federal-
provincial interactions and among the executives of the provinces in interprovincial 
actions.”124 The danger of executive federalism is that it relocated negotiations out of the 
political realm and into the offices of the executive and the bureaucracy. When executive 
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federalism and by extension co-operative federalism is viewed in such a fashion one 
could come to the conclusion that, “The heart of co-operative federalism is secret deals, 
not the stuff on which a lively democracy thrives!”125 In an attempt to limit the 
subversive effects of co-operative federalism, Breton proposes a variety of solutions, 
most notably that all federal-provincial consultation must take place in the debates that 
follow discussions in the House of Commons and provincial parliaments and not in 
closed meetings that precede parliamentary interactions.126 
 Two major concerns stemmed from the Canadian political system’s adherence to 
the tenets of co-operative federalism. First, Breton warned that separatism would thrive 
within a federation that utilizes co-operative federalism since federations are inherently 
competitive. Given that the component parts that make up a federation are constantly 
competing with one another, a co-operative framework would allow separatists to claim 
that the entire system does not work.127 Breton maintained that if inter-governmental co-
operation was suppressed the separatist argument would be weakened.  
Second, co-operative federalism condemns unilateralism, which is the 
independent action by one government of the federation.128 As indicated by Smiley, “… 
cooperative federalism embodies consultations between the provinces and the federal 
government prior to the latter committing itself to policies directly affecting provincial 
interests.”129 Breton goes one step further by clarifying that proponents of co-operative 
federalism condemn any unilateral action by either level of government. This particular 
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principle of co-operative federalism drastically affects the activities of the federal 
government and only minimally impedes policy objectives within provincial 
jurisdiction.130 For example, in order for the provinces to act in unison there must be an 
agreement that is reached between ten separate competitive entities. On the other hand, 
the central government is far more likely to act unilaterally than the provinces seeing as 
the federal government’s policy responsibilities have national implications and because 
these obligations have a greater likelihood of imposing on provincial jurisdiction. 
Therefore, by prohibiting unilateral governmental action co-operative federalism is 
preventing the federal government from addressing issues it alone can resolve and is 
constitutionally responsible for sorting out.131 Breton concludes by stipulating that a 
denial of unilateralism equates to the rejection of the division of powers and federalism 
itself and continuing to abide by the principles of co-operative federalism is akin to the 
creation of a unitary state disguised within a federal system. 132 
In essence, according to Breton it is of great necessity to foster a culture of 
competition within the Canadian Federation in order to ensure the effective maintenance 
of the Canadian democracy. The parliamentary system is characteristically less 
competitive because it has far fewer checks and balances when compared to countries 
that employ a congressional scheme.133 When likened to the congressional composition in 
the United States, it is easier for laws to be passed within the confines of the Canadian 
parliamentary system. When it is more difficult to pass legislation it demonstrates that 
numerous obstacles are in place. For statutes to overcome various impediments political 
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figures must discuss and debate on the matters to be legislated.134 Increased debate leads 
to more involvement by politicians, lobbyists, bureaucrats, academics, writers and so on. 
This enhanced system of checks and balances stimulates discussion in the public forum 
and at the same time, heightening society’s demand for access to information and 
decreasing secrecy within political institutions.135 With greater public involvement in the 
legislative process the legitimacy of statutes is intensified. This newfound legitimacy 
translates into valid legislation that is far less likely to be reversed or repealed even with 
the inevitable change of governments.136   
In sum, Breton maintains that a Canadian parliamentary system with greater 
checks and balances would be beneficial to all Canadians and to the survival of Canadian 
democracy. In contrast, co-operative federalism advances the idea that the establishment 
and maintenance of consultative mechanisms will ensure the creation of accepted 
legislation and limit the inter-governmental tensions that often result in constitutional 
litigation.  
4.2 Brief Comparison of Co-Operative Federalism and Competitive 
Federalism 
There is little doubt that the competitive dynamic is inherent within the Canadian 
Federation as it is “… rooted in ideological diversity, genuine differences of interest 
arising from differences in material/economic base and societal demands, and the 
electoral imperative to gain credit and avoid blame.”137 Numerous provincial and national 
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political parties are constantly jostling for position with voters, while attempting to 
maximize autonomy and jurisdiction.138  
Regardless of the competition that exists within the federation, inter-governmental 
relations after the 1930’s have been characterized as an era of executive federalism, 
where elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government constantly 
interact.139 Breton warned that the shift away from ‘classical federalism’ would prove to 
be detrimental to the effective function of Canadian federalism. This classical model was 
prevalent prior to World War II and is described as a time when both levels of 
government operated independently with little legislative overlap or inter-governmental 
collaboration.140  
The concept of co-operative federalism was introduced after the Second World 
War when the federal government took the lead in establishing the foundations of the 
modern welfare state.141 The federal government required the assistance of the provinces, 
since matters like health and welfare are areas that fall within provincial jurisdiction.142 
Over the years consultative structures were created that ensured constant communication 
between elected officials and public servants of both orders of government. The 
emergence of executive federalism has been viewed by the academic community as a 
response to policy interdependence or, “…the overlap and duplication that are inevitable 
with two activist orders of government.”143 Since the rise of the modern welfare state 
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there have been very few policy areas in which either Ottawa or the provinces operate 
without infringing on the jurisdiction of another government. Even the most 
straightforward of policy initiatives may require collaboration between governments. In 
the modern Canadian federation a government with the necessary authority to make a 
decision must consider the implications for other governments.144 
When referring to Donald V. Smiley’s definition of executive federalism, there is 
no mention of the public being involved in inter-governmental negotiations. Breton 
explained that the lack of public participation “spoils the promise of democratic openness 
and responsiveness that is inherent in classical federalism.”145 Under classical federalism 
it is possible for governments to compete for the affections of the masses. Furthermore, 
when governments act purely on their own authority, as they do in classical federalism, 
clear lines of accountability are drawn.146 Hence, it is less difficult for the public to 
identify which level of government is responsible for each policy initiative.     
Overall, Breton’s theory of competitive federalism contains valid points of 
discussion. However, he believes that a competitive environment with checks and 
balances is essential for the continuance of the parliamentary organization of 
government.147 This notion comes from the idea that, just as competition produces 
superior benefits in the open market by preventing market domination of monopolies and 
oligopolies, society will be better served by governments moving within a competitive 
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setting.148 Breton compares co-operative federalism to collusion directed at serving the 
interests of political elites and not ordinary citizens.149 However, in an age of increasing 
policy collaboration both domestically and internationally, it can be said that competitive 
federalism will only result in minor solutions that only help particular provinces or 
regions. Canadian federalism based on inter-governmental co-operation has demonstrated 
the uncanny ability to evolve and adapt based on the current demands of the Canadian 
Federation. 
Up to this point this project has analyzed the historical roots of the Canadian 
Federation to reveal that the country was founded by two groups of individuals, one 
group that supported national unity and another that favoured regional diversity. Canada 
was created through the utilization of the federal system of government to appease the 
proponents of national cohesion and proponents of diversity. The signing of the original 
British North America Act in 1867 would create numerous provinces held together by one 
central governmental branch. The provinces and the federal government were each 
designated areas of exclusive jurisdiction that were enforced by the constitutional 
interpretation of the courts. The presence of a new federal system in Canada meant that 
inter-governmental tension was guaranteed. Until 1930, the JCPC reinforced the era of 
classical federalism, a time in Canada where each individual jurisdiction operated in 
relative isolation from one another with little or no jurisdictional overlap. The Great 
Depression, World War II and the establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada as 
Canada’s final court of appeal in 1949, all led to the end of the classical federalism era 
and assisted with the introduction of co-operative federalism. An extensive system of 
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inter-governmental consultative structures were established in an effort to combat the 
effects of the Great Depression and meet the societal demands of a modern Canada. The 
concept of co-operative federalism was extremely attractive because it allowed for the 
constant redistribution of powers and resources between governments without the 
involvement of the judiciary or constitutional amendment. This allowed for both 
governments to efficiently implement policy without extended delays.  
The concept of competitive federalism as theorized by Albert Breton assumes that 
greater checks and balances in the Canadian political system will result in better policy 
initiatives. Still, it has been proposed that the tenets of co-operative federalism will create 
superior legislation in a flexible and highly efficient manner and this will result in 
decreased inter-governmental tensions.  
However, in order to effectively assess the usefulness of co-operative federalism a 
recent legislative saga will be examined. The next section of this thesis will therefore be 
dedicated to analyzing the development of a piece of federal legislation known as the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004). Once the genesis of the Act has been examined 
there will be a brief overview of the provisions contained within the legislation. Once that 
section is complete the final portion of the project will be dedicated to providing a critical 
commentary on the Supreme Court reference opinion entitled the Ref re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (2010). The constitutional justifications utilized by both the federal 
government and the provincial governments will be assessed. The opinions of the Court 
will be discussed followed by various reactions from the academic community. It will be 
proposed that the federal legislation did not survive constitutional scrutiny because the 
tenets of co-operative federalism were not adhered to during the formulation of the Act. 
40 
 
Finally, a discussion concerning the implications the reference opinion may have on 
future constitutional disputes and assisted human reproductive technology will take place. 
The logic behind analyzing all of these components is to show that the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act is a bad example of co-operative federalism and that if the tenets of the 
concept were extensively utilized throughout the legislative process it would have been 
less likely that constitutionality of the Act would have been challenged.   
5. The Genesis of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
Canada along with the United States, Switzerland and Australia, is one of the first 
major federal nations to exist worldwide. Canadians must contend with local and 
municipal governments, provincial and territorial governments, Aboriginal governments 
and the federal government. Jennifer Smith posits that “given the size of the country and 
the heterogeneity of the population, [one might say] that it would hardly do to organize 
the governing system any other way.”150 To account for the vast size and diversity of the 
country the creation of a federation was the most suitable structure for Canada. However, 
because Canada is a federation the diverse views that exist across the country will result 
in a never-ending cycle of political and societal tension. This strain that is always 
apparent in inter-governmental relations worsens when new controversial topics arise. In 
2004 the federal government passed An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction 
and Related Research.151 The Act, which would later be referred to as the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act (AHRA), was the culmination of fifteen years of research and 
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policy development in a field that could not have been foreseen at the time of 
Confederation.152  
5.1 The Evolving Influence of Women in the 1980’s  
In the early 1980’s the Canadian political forum underwent drastic alterations 
following the successful patriation of the Canadian Constitution. At this time there was a 
collective and highly focused campaign in which many women who were lawyers played 
a significant role in the wording of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.153 This section of the Charter guaranteed equality rights by ensuring no one 
would be discriminated against based on “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability…”154 The prominent role that women in a 
variety of capacities had on the wording of this section affected political events for the 
remainder of the decade. For instance, the legal recourse for those experiencing 
discrimination encouraged the establishment of the Women’s Legal Education and 
Action Fund.155 This powerful charitable organization ensured countless legal successes 
that drastically impacted political discourse pertaining to women’s rights in Canada and 
around the world.156 The most famous contribution of this group was their activities that 
led to the implementation of equal pay for work of equal value in the public sector.157 
Around the same time, women’s abortion rights were being questioned in the political 
and legal arenas. The activities of Dr. Henry Morgentaler acted as the catalyst that 
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prompted the abortion debate amongst lawyers and politicians. The arrest and 
imprisonment of Dr. Morgentaler following the realization that he was operating illegal 
abortion clinics solidified that the topic required Parliament’s attention.158 After the 
highly publicized Supreme Court of Canada judgment and extensive political debates, 
abortion was decriminalized in 1988.159 
5.2 The Push For An Investigation Into Assisted Reproductive Technology 
When the late 1980’s came around feminist activists, academics and health 
advocates began pushing for a formal inquiry into new human reproductive technology in 
Canada. This collection of individuals formed the Canadian Coalition for a Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.160 The group chose to lobby for a 
Royal Commission because of the favourable reception of the previous Royal 
Commission on the Status of Women that took place between 1967 and 1971.161 The 
coalition justified the need for biotechnology policy in Canada by emphasizing the social 
and ethical implications of genetic technologies. This approach was vastly different from 
the biotechnology policies in other countries that were considered in the interest of 
economic policy. For example, in the United States private companies fund the vast 
majority of medical research, and these are not subject to federal funding regulations.162 
As a result, the approach of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies ensured these social and ethical considerations would be 
considered throughout the duration of the ensuing Royal Commission. 
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After a long lobbying campaign the efforts of the Coalition were successful when 
in 1989 the Canadian government appointed the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies.163 Dr. Patricia Baird was selected as Chair of the 
Commission and like many other Royal Commissions commonly known by the name of 
the chair, the Baird Commission commenced in 1989.164 The commission was charged 
with the mandate to:  
“examine current and potential scientific and medical developments related to 
reproductive technologies but also to go beyond them to consider: the impact of the 
technologies on society as a whole; their impact on identified groups in society, 
specifically women, children, and families; and the ethical, legal, social, economic, 
and health implications of these technologies.”165 
The Baird Commission was plagued with difficulties from the outset with the most 
notable challenge being a severe lack of public feedback on the topic. Those who have 
analyzed the processes utilized by the Royal Commission have been able to reveal a 
variety of procedural flaws including the poor design of public hearings, and the presence 
of an intimidating and dismissive hearing atmosphere.166 Furthermore, these glaring 
inadequacies were most apparent when the Commission admitted to have knowingly 
lacked input from “francophones, ethno-cultural groups, religious groups, and 
aboriginals…”167 The Commission maintained that these sub-sections of the population 
had no valid opinions to provide regarding the topic of assisted reproductive 
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technologies.168 The issues uncovered by critics made it apparent that the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was not fully addressing its mandate, 
especially with regards to examining the impact of biotechnology on vulnerable groups. 
In 1991 four Commissioners publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
exclusionary design of the Commission’s public participation component, its internal 
politics and Dr. Patricia Baird’s fostering of an undemocratic internal structure.169 
Finally, after a launching a lawsuit against the Commission, the four commissioners were 
fired and the final report was released without four of its original members.170 
5.3 The Commission’s Final Report: Proceed with Care 
The procedural problems that occurred during the operation of the Baird 
Commission led to a politically charged atmosphere when the completed report was 
released to the public.171 The highly publicized objections of the four former 
Commissioners only enhanced tensions. Nevertheless, the Commission released its final 
report entitled Proceed with Care in 1993.172 Although it did not seem like it throughout 
the term of the Commission, the final recommendations reflected the original objectives 
of the Canadian Coalition for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. 
The report conveyed this purpose when it embodied the spirit of caution against the 
commercialization of human bodies.173 Overall, the report received a warm welcome 
when it was realized that its findings had the potential to revolutionize reproductive 
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healthcare governance in Canada.174  
The framework instituted in the United Kingdom significantly influenced the 
drafting of the Canadian legislation. In particular, this inspiration came from the U.K’s 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990.175 The birth of Britain’s first baby with 
the aid of assisted human reproductive technology in 1978 initiated a series of debates 
related to the ethical issues of assisted human reproduction.176 These deliberations 
culminated in Baroness Warnock’s 1985 report A Question of Life that formed the basis 
of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act.177 An important goal sought by the 
drafters of the AHRA was to create a structure that included a regulatory body as 
influential as the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.178 The 
establishment of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada emulated this organization. The 
adoption of this model was extremely attractive due to the ongoing regulatory vacuum 
that was present in an expanding technological field. Although the Canadian legislation 
analyzed this foreign legislation to assist in the construction of an effective statute, the 
AHRA was the culmination of an extensive consultation process that established a 
uniquely Canadian framework.179  
The distinctively Canadian nature of the legislation was essential due to the 
fundamental political differences that exist between Canada and the United Kingdom. 
Academics often note that, in the field of healthcare and biotechnology policy, Canada 
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has experienced difficulties formulating legislation because of the countless jurisdictional 
issues that arise between the federal and provincial governments.180 Jones and Salter 
quoted a respondent in their 2010 article who stated “Canada is different to Britain… 
You need to… [create legislation] …in the context of federal/provincial relations, which 
are always touchy; but you cannot do it any other way because if it was different in every 
province you would get reproductive tourism… It wouldn’t make sense for the 
country.”181 Additionally, the authors noted that despite the apparent need for the 
framework, it was difficult to garner significant provincial support for the AHRA.182 It 
was also suggested that the delicate negotiations between the federal and provincial 
governments prevented Canada from legislating in this field at an earlier time.183 Due to 
the absence of a federal-parliamentary system, British legislators did not encounter the 
critical jurisdictional impediments experienced by Canadian public officials. Regardless 
of the well-known inter-governmental tensions between Canadian governmental bodies, 
many continued to believe that the introduction of a federal framework was the best route 
to take.184  
Two years after the publication of Proceed with Care the Minister of Health 
Diane Marleau announced a voluntary moratorium on several reproductive technologies 
that the Baird Commission had found to be contrary to Canadian ethics and values.185 
The resulting committee provided the necessary transition between the final report of the 
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Baird Commission and the development of a possible regulatory framework.186 
Ultimately, “…several incarnations, five health ministers, two parliamentary sessions, 
and many stakeholder consultations…” were needed for the results of the Baird 
Commission to become federal legislation.187 The completed legislation known as Bill C-
6 An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research received Royal 
Assent on March 31, 2004.188  
5.4 Overview of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
The completed legislation closely followed the major recommendations outlined 
in the final report of the Baird Commission. The report suggested a combination of 
criminal sanctions and regulations to provide the legislation with the ability to be flexible 
and to further respond to evolving technologies.189 The Royal Commission was clear in 
communicating its unwavering support of a national framework, stating in the final report 
that matters “so important to women and children… cannot differ from province to 
province.”190 Using the social and moral implications of assisted reproductive 
technologies as a platform, the Baird Commission found ample justification to anchor the 
AHRA within federal jurisdiction. It was determined that the federal government was 
justified in the creation of a national framework due to the criminal law power and the 
residual peace, order, and good government clause that both permit federal legislation in 
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areas of ‘national concern’.191   
5.4.1 Prohibited Activities 
The federal government set out to clearly prohibit specific activities with the 
AHRA. Sections 5 to 9 of the Act ban certain actions and if someone breaches these 
provisions are guilty of a criminal offence and  
a) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding $500,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or both; or 192 
b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding four years, or both.193  
 
Section 5 pertains to activities involving technical knowledge. The legislation 
prohibits the cloning of a human being194 as well as creating an in vitro embryo for any 
purposes other than creating a human or improving assisted human reproductive 
processes.195 To clarify, an in vitro embryo means an embryo that exists outside of the 
body of a human being. The transfer or creation of an embryo from any part of a cell, 
embryo or foetus for the purpose of creating a human being is prohibited.196 Following 
the fourteenth day of development it is illegal to artificially maintain an embryo, in a 
manner that would allow it to continue maturing outside the body of a female.197 Beyond 
the intention of creating a human being, alterations are prohibited that would increase the 
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probability that an embryo will be a particular sex.198 The only exception to this provision 
would be if the alteration would prevent, diagnose, or treat a sex-linked disorder or 
disease.199 Furthermore, it is forbidden to alter the genome of a cell to a point where the 
alteration would be capable of being transmitted to descendants.200 Any activity involving 
the mixture of human and non-human genetic material for the purposes of creating 
chimera or hybrids is strictly forbidden.201 Under Section 5 (2) and Section 5 (3) of the 
AHRA, offering, advertising, paying or offering to pay for any of the above activities is 
designated as committing a criminal offence.202  
The provisions located in Section 6 of the Act concern activities involving 
surrogate mothers. It is illegal for a person to pay, offer to pay or advertise payment for a 
surrogate mother.203 Similarly, it is a criminal offense for someone to pay, advertise or 
offer to pay an intermediary to arrange surrogacy services, and for an intermediary to 
offer, advertise or organize surrogate services.204 Another provision relating to surrogate 
mothers stipulates that, no female under the age of 21 should be counselled, induced, or 
undergo any medical procedure to become a surrogate mother.205 The final subsection on 
surrogate mothers stipulates that the entirety of Section 6 does not affect the validity of 
provincial laws that enable agreements under which a person agrees to become a 
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surrogate mother.206  
Section 7 of the AHRA contains the provisions directed at preventing the 
commercialization of human tissue. No person is allowed to purchase, offer to purchase 
or advertise the purchase of in vitro embryos, sperm, ova or any other reproductive 
material. In addition, individuals are prohibited from selling, offering to sell or 
advertising to sell in vitro embryos.207 Section 8 stipulates that reproductive materials and 
in vitro embryos shall not be utilized without the express written consent of the donor.208 
These same conditions also apply in the event of the donor’s demise.209 Finally, Section 9 
concludes the ‘Prohibited Activities’ section by declaring donors must be at least 18 
years of age for the use of any sperm or ova obtained, “except for the purpose of 
preserving the sperm or ovum or for the purpose of creating a human being that the 
person believes will be raised by the donor.”210  
5.4.2 Controlled Activities 
The bulk of the AHRA was dedicated to the establishment of a regulatory 
framework where assisted reproductive activities would be permitted if practices 
occurred in accordance with the regulations and a license issued by the regulatory board 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada. Specifically, Sections 10 to 13 specify 
the ‘Controlled Activities’ of the Act. Section 10 designates that no person can alter, 
manipulate or treat human reproductive material or an in vitro embryo, unless; the 
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activities are in accordance with regulations and the required license.211 Also, except in 
compliance with regulations and a license, restrictions are placed on one’s ability to 
obtain, transfer, destroy, import or export reproductive material.212 Section 11 explains 
that combining human genetic material with any part of the genome of another species is 
restricted, except in accordance with the regulations of the Act and a license.213  Section 
12 deals specifically with economic considerations such as reimbursement of 
expenditures and receipts. Any reimbursements or expenditures that are incurred require 
a license and documentary proof of expenses.214 With regards to surrogacy, it is 
forbidden to compensate the mother for a loss of work-related income unless a medical 
practitioner provides a certificate validating that continuing to work would pose a risk to 
the mother and the unborn child.215 The final part of the ‘Controlled Activities’ section 
states that the federal government controls the locations where the regulated activities 
may be conducted. Thus, activities shall only occur on premises that have been granted a 
license.216 Sections 14 to 20 establish rules for the collection of data and the respect of 
privacy and access to information. Criminal penalties in section 61 of the AHRA stipulate 
that whoever contravenes any of the ‘Controlled Activities’ is guilty of a criminal offence 
and  
a) is liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both; or 217  
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b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding two years, or both.218 
 
 To conclude, the focus on social and ethical implications of assisted human 
reproduction was central during the term of the Baird Commission. This emphasis 
enabled legal scholars to understand why the Commission cited the federal responsibility 
related to criminal law to justify legislating in a field of disputed jurisdiction. However, 
the ‘Controlled Activities’ provisions in the Act were far more contentious, especially 
considering the jurisdictional implications of the regulatory provisions designated within 
the section. 
 
5.5 General Observations 
Several general observations of the legislation are as follows. The Act embodies 
the overall perspective of academics writing in the field of biotechnology policy because 
of its focus on social and ethical issues. In contrast, the economic focus of American 
biotechnology policy is often seen as unusual because in the scholarly literature, assisted 
reproduction is discussed under the umbrella of moral policy rather than economic 
policy.219  Regulations in relation to “embryonic stem-cell research; and payment for 
sperm, eggs, and surrogacy constitute legal sanctions of right and wrong that validate a 
particular set of fundamental values.”220 Although some areas require payment 
considerations, issues related to assisted reproduction are not chiefly economic. The 
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primary concerns in this field involve parentage, identity, sexuality, reproduction, gender, 
and human life itself.221 Additionally, assisted reproduction policy is framed in the 
language of individual rights such as “the rights of the infertile; fetal rights; the rights of 
single mothers, gays and lesbians; and, most frequently, the rights of children born 
through assisted reproduction.”222 For example, the legislation forbids “a variety of 
genetics-related technologies including such controversial activities as the creation of 
chimerae or hybrids and human germ-line alteration.”223 Furthermore, when compared to 
the biotechnology legislation enacted by other modern nations, the AHRA takes a strict 
stance against the commercialization of human tissue.224 The AHRA prohibits the direct 
exchange of payment for sperm and eggs, and for surrogate motherhood. It is possible for 
exchanges to happen but these interactions must occur in the form of expense 
reimbursement.225 Finally, those who contravene provisions of the Act are committing a 
criminal offense and the authors view this as an attempt “to police a powerful 
professional community, the medical practitioners.”226 
5.6 The Legislative Landscape and the AHRA  
It is important to remind oneself of the legislative landscape during and after the 
drafting of the AHRA. Throughout the legislative process leading up to the creation of the 
AHRA, some provinces complained that the regulatory aspects of the Act infringed upon 
the provincial jurisdiction over the social and medical aspects of fertility technologies.227 
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However, legal academic Dave Snow points out that “because few provincial 
governments actually expressed any desire to legislate, the federal government moved 
forward with the AHRA.”228 Quebec was the only province that maintained certain 
aspects of the AHRA were unconstitutional, through a series of letters written to the 
federal Minister of Health.229 The reservations of the Quebec government were taken into 
consideration, but the threat of a legislative vacuum in a growing technological field was 
too drastic to ignore.  
Ultimately, numerous stakeholders and groups involved in the drafting of the 
legislation had to make compromises to ensure the survival of the legislation.230 During 
the drafting process, virtually all organizations and individuals who appeared before 
Parliament called for the Bill to be passed.231 Even the Catholic Church, who are 
completely opposed to embryo research urged Parliament to pass the legislation.232 These 
religious representatives pointed to the events that surrounded the previous abortion laws 
in Canada. During the abortion saga, numerous organizations fought against the Canadian 
abortion law and in the end the statute was struck down and no law was able to pass the 
scrutiny of the Senate to take its place.233 Consequently there is no current criminal law in 
Canada that regulates or forbids abortion.  
By the end of the 1990’s the stakes were high and it was recognized that there was 
an urgent need for policy to take shape in this area. The lack of a regulatory framework in 
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Canada prior to the AHRA allowed for clinicians and researchers to practice numerous 
controversial activities without guidance or restriction.234 Although it was not possible for 
everyone involved with the legislation to be completely satisfied, most could agree that 
some sort of framework was preferred rather than none at all.235 In any event, although 
the genesis of the AHRA was plagued with problems from the outset and numerous 
constitutional questions arose, the legislation that was created using the Commission’s 
findings was well received and considered a necessity for Canada by all those involved.  
The presence of a legislative vacuum in the field of assisted human reproduction 
was one of the main motivations for creating a broad national regulatory framework. The 
Quebec government was adamant in their view that the regulatory scheme instituted by 
the federal government violated the division of powers as set out in the Constitution Act, 
1867. Shortly after the AHRA received Royal Assent, the Quebec government launched a 
reference to the Quebec Court of Appeal to determine the constitutional validity of the 
Act. It seemed as though the Government of Quebec was emboldened by the fact that the 
provincial legislature were in the midst of drafting provincial laws related to assisted 
reproduction. In 2009 the government of Quebec passed An Act respecting clinical and 
research activities relating to assisted procreation.236 With the enactment of the Assisted 
Procreation Act Quebec passed several Civil Code provisions concerning assisted 
reproduction, has included in vitro fertilization under provincial health coverage since 
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2010, and has adapted its regulations in response to recent judicial decisions.237  
Unilateral efforts on behalf of the Canadian federal government to initiate policy 
development are not unheard of in Canada. As mentioned, Ottawa in the past has used its 
spending power to influence provincial policy, including health policy.238 In recent years 
federal approaches to harmonize health policy has been on the decline and this new 
environment is not well suited to organize the regulation of assisted reproductive 
technology. Dave Snow and Rainer Knopff point to Ottawa’s leadership in achieving 
Canada’s Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) where “Ottawa initiated negotiations but 
then came to be seen ‘as an equal party’ rather than a ‘dominant senior partner in inter-
governmental arrangements’”.239 While further trade policy harmonization has been 
propelled by provincial collaboration, the federal government brought the issue to the 
forefront of the provincial economic agendas.240 Still, the presence of inter-provincial 
trade barriers exist in Canada and some believe that Ottawa should use its influence to 
impose its will on reluctant provinces. However, as will be discussed in the following 
section of this project, Ottawa cannot impose its will outside of its criminal law 
jurisdiction to influence assisted reproduction technology. Snow and Knopff state that the 
federal government “must rely on the softer power of inter-governmental negotiation and 
persuasion.”, to influence other aspects of assisted human reproduction policy.241 
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6. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
6.1 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (Quebec Court of Appeal) 
 The passing of the AHRA occurred with plenty of constitutional uncertainty, 
particularly because the legislation instituted a broad national strategy that was highly 
centralized in a field commonly operated by the provinces. The risks that were taken 
during the formulation, drafting, and passing of the AHRA were constitutionally assessed 
when the government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal 
concerning the constitutional validity of the Act.242 The reference question was submitted 
in 2008 only four years after the Act received Royal Assent. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Quebec was the only government that actively opposed the passing of the AHRA, 
so it seemed appropriate that Quebec would be the province to formally challenge the 
federal legislation. According to the Attorney General of Quebec, the pith and substance 
of the legislation was the regulation of all aspects of medical practices related to assisted 
reproduction, including medical practitioners and the institutions where these individuals 
work, the doctor-patient relationship, and civil aspects of medically assisted human 
reproduction.243 The province of Quebec declared that the legislation was meant to 
regulate the exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, as stipulated 
in section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.244 The Attorney General of Canada 
submitted that the impugned provisions were valid pursuant to the Parliament of 
Canada’s power to enact laws in relation to criminal law and the ‘double aspect 
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doctrine’.245 He explained that the purpose of the Act is to protect health, safety, and 
public morals and that because of this the AHRA had a valid criminal law purpose.246  
Double occupancy of a field such as health is a permanent feature of the Canadian 
constitutional structure. It leads to a standard of ‘double aspect’ analysis under which two 
separate aspects, one federal and the other provincial, exist side by side unless there is a 
conflict, in which case the federal aspect prevails.247 The absolute prohibitions were 
conceded to be valid criminal law and were not challenged. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
issued its reference opinion, siding entirely with the government of Quebec and ruling 
nearly every regulatory component of the AHRA unconstitutional.248 When the Attorney 
General of Canada appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada he did not include the 
‘double aspect’ doctrine in his justification. Therefore, for the purposes of this project it 
is not necessary to perform an examination of the ‘double aspect’ doctrine. On the other 
hand, in order to fully understand the federal government’s reasoning for using the 
federal criminal law power to justify its argument in the Supreme Court reference case 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2010), it is essential to perform a brief 
analysis of the criminal law power as an accepted constitutional principle. Furthermore, 
in the Supreme Court reference the position of the Attorney General of Quebec remained 
the same, thus an explanation of the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights 
will also be provided. 
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6.2 Federal Criminal Law Power 
 In Canada, Section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 assigns the responsibility 
of criminal law to federal Parliament.249 As demonstrated by the case law, s.91 (27) has 
experienced dramatic shifts of judicial interpretation. In the 1922 reference decision 
entitled Reference re The Board of Commerce Act,250 Viscount Haldane interpreted the 
criminal law power as applicable only “where the subject matter is one which by its very 
nature belongs to the domain of criminal jurisprudence.”251 The definition of the criminal 
law power provided in the Reference re The Board of Commerce Act opinion appeared to 
be quite restrictive. Although Viscount Haldane did not clarify what was meant by ‘the 
domain of criminal jurisprudence’, Peter Hogg argues that “the phrase could be read as 
freezing the criminal law into a mould established at some earlier time, presumably 
1867.”252  
Subsequently in 1931, four years after the death of Viscount Haldane, Lord Atkin 
rendered a decision in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. AG Canada (P.A.T.A)253 
that drastically altered the interpretation of the criminal law power. Lord Atkin rejected 
the narrow definition of criminal law, which stipulated that the power would be restricted 
to matters that have traditionally fallen within the domain of criminal jurisprudence.254 
Instead, Lord Atkin declared a very wide definition of the criminal law power, one “that 
included all acts that at any particular period of time are prohibited with penal 
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sanctions.”255 However, this new definition appeared too wide, as it would enable the 
federal Parliament to expand its jurisdiction indiscriminately, simply by presenting 
legislation in the form of a prohibition accompanied by a penalty.256 Lord Atkin clarified 
that this new understanding of the criminal law power did not excuse Parliament if it used 
this power to intentionally encroach on provincial jurisdiction.257 According to Hogg, 
“the P.A.T.A. definition is still too wide, because it would uphold any federal law which 
employs a prohibition and penalty as its primary mode of operation.”258  
One of the most famous cases related to the criminal law power is commonly 
referred to as the Margarine Reference (1951).259 Modern discussions of Parliament’s 
criminal law power begin with this reference because the opinion rendered establishes a 
third criterion in the definition of criminal law. In the 1880’s the federal government 
passed legislation that prohibited the manufacture, importation or sale of margarine.260 At 
this time margarine posed a legitimate threat to the health and safety of Canadians. This 
was because the poor quality of the product led to the presence of abnormally high e-coli 
levels within margarine. During World War II, however, there was a shortage of dairy 
products because of resources being dedicated to the war effort and many farmers were 
involved as soldiers in the conflict overseas. Moreover, after the war ended it was 
recognized that margarine had began to be manufactured differently and that as a result, it 
was a realistic cheaper oil-based substitute to dairy products such as butter. As time 
passed, it was realized that the purpose of the prohibition on margarine was to protect the 
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dairy industry.261 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that, although the law 
pertaining to margarine abided by the criminal form of a prohibition backed by a penalty, 
the economic aspect of the legislation insulating the dairy industry from competition 
made the substance of the law related to property and civil rights of the provinces.262 The 
judicial reasoning that followed from the Margarine Reference opinion has had a lasting 
impact on the Canadian conception of the federal criminal law power. The JCPC adopted 
the reasoning of Canadian Supreme Court Justice Rand, when they accepted that a 
criminal prohibition was not criminal unless it served “a public purpose which can 
support it as being in relation to the criminal law.”263 Specifically, public peace, order, 
security, health and morality were considered ordinary but not exclusive ends served by 
criminal law.264 After establishing this new step in the criminal law analysis, Rand J. 
determined that the protection of the dairy industry did not constitute a qualifying 
purpose to invoke the criminal law power.265 
The judicial reasoning of Viscount Haldane, Lord Atkin and finally, Canadian 
Supreme Court Justice Rand outlined the fundamental tenets of the criminal law power.  
Yet the specific facet of the criminal law power that directly pertains to the Reference re 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act is whether Rand’s interpretation of section 91 (27) 
“will sustain the establishment of a regulatory scheme in which an administrative agency 
or official exercises discretionary authority.”266 Typically, there is not any intervention by 
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an administrative agency or official prior to the application of a law.267 It is common for a 
law to be administered by law enforcement officials and for the courts to act in a 
mechanical capacity after the prohibited conduct has occurred.268 The cases that follow 
are meant to demonstrate the progression of the relationship between criminal law and 
regulatory authority. 
6.2.1 Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil 
In 1967, the provincial government of Nova Scotia enacted the Theatres and 
Amusements Act to establish a licensing and regulation system for the showing of motion 
pictures.269 The legislation required all films to be submitted to the provincial censor 
board prior to being released to the public.270 The board had the power to allow or forbid 
the showing of a film, or to permit its exhibition with alterations.271 Sanction for breach 
of board regulations resulted in a monetary penalty and removal of the theatre owner’s 
license.272 A private citizen pursued legal action to have the censor board regulations 
declared unconstitutional, specifically by arguing that the provincial legislature was 
infringing on federal jurisdiction by wrongfully exercising the criminal law power.  
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada in Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. 
McNeil,273 by a narrow margin of five to four, held that the censorship of films was not 
criminal.274 Ritchie J., writing for the majority, determined that the provincial censorship 
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law did not take criminal form because it did not issue a prohibition coupled with a 
penalty.275 As noted by Hogg, the suppression of ideas that are contrary to current moral 
attitudes is a criminal objective but in this instance the prior case law necessitated a 
particular form as well as a criminal objective.276  
The precedent set by Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil outlined that one of 
the main constraints on the criminal law power was in relation to form. The usual form of 
criminal legislation is characterized by a prohibition and penalty enforced by the 
courts.277 
The presence of regulatory features in federal legislation “such as powers of 
licensing and prior inspection, involvement of an administrative agency exercising 
discretionary authority in the administration of the law, detailed regulation and civil 
remedies” may prevent the judiciary from viewing the law as an authentic exercise of the 
criminal law power.278 It is important to note that, in cases where a clear criminal law 
purpose has been found, courts have allowed for a slight departure from the general 
expectation that valid criminal law must be a prohibition backed by a penalty.279  
6.2.2 R. v. Hydro-Quebec 
 The federal government established a framework under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act that regulated the use and disposal of toxic substances.280 
Under the legislation the Canadian Minister of Health and the Minister of Environment 
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were granted the authority to examine the effects of substances and recommend the 
substance be labeled toxic.281 Once classified as toxic, the substance comes under the 
regulatory authority of the Governor in Council, which may institute regulations 
pertaining to the toxic substance.282 These directives may include how the substance is 
imported, manufactured, processed, transported, stored, sold, used, discarded and 
released into the environment.283 However, in select circumstances where a substance has 
not yet been classified as toxic, either Minister may decide immediate action must be 
taken and issue an ‘interim order’ in the absence of full toxic categorization.284 The 
interim order is temporary but breach of the order or of an established regulation is an 
offence punishable by fine or imprisonment.285  
 In the 1997 Canadian Supreme Court case entitled R. v. Hydro-Quebec (Hydro-
Quebec),286 Hydro-Quebec was accused of violating an interim order issued under the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act.287 The order was violated when Hydro-Quebec 
dumped chlorobiphenyls into a river in 1990.288 The corporation argued that the entire 
Act, and by extension the interim order, was ultra vires the federal jurisdiction of criminal 
law. However, La Forest J. writing for the majority, upheld the Act as a valid exercise of 
the federal government’s criminal law power. The reasoning behind this judgment was 
that, because the administrative procedure resulted in a prohibition supported by a penal 
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sanction, the framework was adequately prohibitory in nature.289 Furthermore, he 
recognized that the exemption for provinces with comparative legislation effectively 
meant that the preservation of the environment was concurrent.290 At any rate, this 
decision solidified the modern judicial stance that an extensive degree of regulation could 
be justified under the criminal law power.291  
6.2.3 Reference re Firearms Act (2000) 
 A reference question was posed to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2000, 
pertaining to federal gun control legislation that was a part of the Canadian Criminal 
Code. The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Reference re Firearms Act 
(2000)292 maintained that because the purpose of gun control was public safety the Act 
was serving a criminal law purpose.293 It was argued that the legislation was regulatory 
rather than criminal because of the statutory complexity of the scheme and the 
discretionary powers granted to licensing authorities.294 Opponents of the legislation 
declared that only an outright prohibition of guns would constitute a proper criminal 
law.295 In the reference the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the federal 
legislation, which amended the Criminal Code of Canada and created an extensive 
licensing and registration statute for firearms owners.296 To support the opinion of the 
bench, the Supreme Court cited its decision in R. v. Hydro-Quebec to clarify that “the 
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criminal-law power authorizes complex legislation, including discretionary 
administrative authority.”297 Furthermore, the Court highlighted that in RJR-MacDonald 
v. Canada (1995)298 it was determined that a criminal purpose may be pursued by indirect 
means.299 The Court proclaimed that the safety risks of guns did not require an outright 
ban on firearms and similarly, the health hazards of tobacco did not necessitate a 
complete ban of cigarettes.300 In essence, procedures that indirectly advance a legislative 
purpose, such as advertising bans on tobacco products or the licensing and registration of 
firearms, were authorized by the federal criminal law power.301   
Numerous variations in judicial mindset concerning the criminal law and 
regulatory authority are demonstrated in the case law of the federal criminal law power. 
Regardless of these fluctuations, a clear precedent was established leading up to the 
opinion rendered in the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act. This precedent 
demonstrated that it was possible for the criminal law power to justify the institution of 
an intricate legal framework that creates a regulatory board that is able to enforce 
sanctions authorized by specific legislation. 
6.3 Provincial Jurisdiction Over Property and Civil Rights 
When the reference question concerning the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
was posed to the Quebec Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Attorney General of Quebec argued that the legislation infringed upon the 
provincial government’s exclusive legislative authority over property, civil rights and 
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matters of local or private nature.302 Therefore, a brief discussion of these provincial 
responsibilities is essential when attempting to understand the position of the provinces in 
the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act.  
 Section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants the provincial legislatures the 
ability to make laws in relation to “property and civil rights in the province.”303 This 
provincial power has played a significant role in numerous constitutional disputes. As 
Hogg notes, “This is by far the most important of the provincial heads of power.”304 
Arguably the most significant sources of federal power are those pertaining to peace, 
order, and good government, trade and commerce, and criminal law.305 These three major 
federal jurisdictions have come into direct conflict with the property and civil rights 
provision. Many of the most vital cases related to constitutional law have put different 
federal heads of power up against the provincial responsibility over property and civil 
rights.306  
 The phrase ‘property and civil rights’ is one that has long been part of Canadian 
political history, as its presence extends as far back as the Quebec Act, 1774.307 
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between the pre-Confederation meaning of the 
phrase and how the phrase was utilized within the context of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
The first notable appearance of the phrase occurred in section 8 of the Quebec Act, 1774 
and its inclusion resulted in the reinstatement of the French Civil Law tradition as the 
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private law system within the borders of Quebec.308 The section was created to guarantee 
that the entire body of law governing relationships between individuals within Quebec 
would not be displaced.309 Furthermore, the phrase was also included in the first Act of 
the Legislature of the province of Upper Canada, when in 1792 the province declared 
English law as the private law of the colony.310 
  The phrase was solidified when the Fathers of Confederation designated 
‘property and civil rights in the province’ as a provincial power in section 92 (13) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The drafters of the Canadian constitution included property and 
civil rights to describe the complete body of private law that manages the relationships 
between citizens, in contrast to the law that governs interactions between citizens and the 
state.311 Originally, the phrase was meant to have the same meaning as it had obtained in 
1774 and 1792. However, with the creation of a new federal system the property and civil 
rights provision was now operating alongside a new central branch of government with 
extensive powers and responsibilities.312 This new reality altered the traditional definition 
of property and civil rights. For the federal Parliament to operate effectively within the 
Canadian federation it was necessary for certain federal responsibilities to include a 
number of provisions that were part of the original conception of property and civil 
rights.313 Some of the matters that were redistributed included trade and commerce, 
marriage and divorce, patents of invention and discovery, interest, and banking.314 
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Moreover, the peace, order and good government phrase included in the Constitution Act, 
1867 allows the federal government, in situations with national implications, to overstep 
the boundaries established by the property and civil rights provision.  
The use of peace, order and good government to justify the occasional 
infringement of provincial jurisdiction is reflected in the 1966 Supreme Court of Canada 
decision Munro v. National Capital Commission.315 The National Capital Act established 
a National Capital Commission that was mandated to “prepare plans for and assist in the 
development, conservation and improvement of the National Capital Region… in 
accordance with its national significance.”316 Litigation occurred when property owned 
by Munro was expropriated under the Act to ensure the development of the National 
Capital Region around Ottawa.317  Munro argued that the federal legislation was a form 
of planning and zoning legislation already governed by the provincial Planning Acts. The 
decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that the development of the 
National Capital Region was justified under the peace, order and good government 
principle because the development was a single matter of national concern.318 
 Even with the reallocation of specific property and civil rights powers to the list 
of exclusive federal powers “property and civil rights in the province still covers most of 
the legal relationships between persons in Canada.”319 The body of law relating to 
property, succession, the family, contracts and torts is largely within provincial 
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jurisdiction under s. 92 (13).320 It is important for the purposes of this project to highlight 
that the historical foundation of property and civil rights in Canada differs from the 
foundation of similar rights in other nations. The purpose of doing so is to clarify how the 
terms are used and defined in Canadian law.  In the United States, the term ‘civil rights’ 
is interchangeable with the civil liberties that are guaranteed in the American Bill of 
Rights.321 When referring to the use of civil rights in the Constitution Act, 1867, civil 
rights and civil liberties are distinct from one another. The civil rights referred to in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 are made up of mainly proprietary, contractual or tortious 
rights.322 These rights come into existence when a legal rule stipulates that in certain 
circumstances one person is entitled to something from another.323 In contrast, civil 
liberties exist when there is an absence of formal legal rules. In the Canadian context 
saying one has the right to criticize the government is something completely different 
from declaring one’s right to have a loan repaid.324 This differentiation exists because 
there is no law that forbids the criticism of government but there is however, the law of 
contract that stipulates certain commitments must be performed, “…by imposing 
sanctions for non-performance.”325 In sum, the term ‘civil rights’ in s. 92 (13) of the 
Canadian Constitution is utilized in a different sense, especially when compared to the 
United States.  
The dominance of s. 92 (13) in constitutional disputes has resulted in the limited 
use of s.92 (16) or the provincial power over “… all matters of merely local or private 
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nature in the province…”326 Although the section has not been completely ignored, when 
mentioned it is often suggested as an alternative to s. 92 (13) as opposed to an 
independent source of power. Different cases have suggested that arguments would have 
been best served by using s. 92 (16) as the sole justification. In most cases the provincial 
power related to matters of local or private nature is often presented in tandem with s. 92 
(13).   
The powerful provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights and local 
matters are the sections of the Constitution Act, 1867 that the government of Quebec 
cited when the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act went to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The stage was now set for the Supreme Court to analyze the piece of 
legislation and determine the constitutional validity of its provisions. 
6.4 Overview of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (2010) Opinion 
 The opinion written by the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the constitutional 
justification of the AHRA prompted a reaction from the Government of Canada. This 
response occurred when the Attorney General of Canada decided to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Using almost identical constitutional justifications presented 
at the Quebec Court of Appeal the AHRA was to be analyzed by Canada’s highest court. 
However at the Supreme Court level, the Attorney Generals of New Brunswick, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, who were each granted intervener status, supported the 
reasoning of the government of Quebec.  The Supreme Court of Canada issued a 4-4-1 
split opinion regarding the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (Ref re 
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AHRA) in December 2010. The Court was bitterly divided in its opinion particularly 
regarding the dominant purpose of the federal legislation.327 Four justices would have 
held the Act as valid in its entirety because they concluded the dominant purpose was to 
safeguard morality, public health and the personal security of those associated with 
assisted reproductive technology.328 The other four Supreme Court Justices decided that 
the overriding purpose of the AHRA was to regulate assisted human reproduction as a 
health service.329 Essentially, the Justices were contemplating two questions that were 
raised by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin: 
“is the Assisted Human Reproduction Act properly characterized as legislation to 
curtail practices that may contravene morality, create public health evils or put the 
security of individuals at risk, as the Attorney General of Canada contends? Or 
should it be characterized as legislation to promote positive medical practices 
associated with assisted reproduction, as the Attorney General of Quebec 
contends?”330 
It is apparent that the Court was attempting to determine if the dominant purpose of the 
legislation was to prohibit an ‘evil’ or regulate a ‘good’.331 
6.4.1 The Opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin 
 Chief Justice McLachlin, with Justices Binnie, Fish and Charron concurring, 
provided the first opinion in the Ref re AHRA.  McLachlin C.J. began her opinion by 
pointing out that each generation encounters unique moral issues and historically, those 
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generations have relied upon criminal law to address them.332 With the development of 
assisted reproduction technologies important moral, religious and juridical questions 
arose.333 The enormous advances in a budding technological field encouraged the 
Canadian federal government to appoint the Baird Commission in an effort to examine 
the numerous implications of assisted reproduction technologies.334 The efforts and 
findings of the Baird Commission resulted in the creation of the AHRA. The Chief Justice 
clarified that sections 5 to 7 of the AHRA were conceded as criminal law but the Attorney 
General of Quebec was challenging the remaining provisions.335 In the view of 
McLachlin C.J., the additonal sections 8 to 13 would have been declared as valid criminal 
law.336 Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that some of the prohibitions impacted the 
regulation of medical research and practice, as both areas are commonly controlled by the 
provinces. However, the effect that the legislation had on these provincial matters was 
purely incidental to the Act’s criminal law purpose.337 In addition, McLachlin C.J. 
recognized that sections 14 to 68 of the AHRA – the administrative, organizational and 
enforcement provisions – were not, in pith and substance criminal law, but were valid as 
they were essential to the successful operation of the overall prohibition regime.338 
 After providing a breakdown of both the prohibited activities and controlled 
activities sections contained within the AHRA, McLachlin C.J. held that the remaining 
sections of the legislation “are directed [at] administering and enforcing the primary 
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criminal law prohibitions.”339 The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General 
of Quebec viewed the legislation from two fundamentally different perspectives. The 
Attorney General of Canada stated that the purpose and effect of the legislative scheme 
was to prohibit practices that would undercut moral values, produce public evils, and 
threaten the security of donors, donees, and persons conceived by assisted 
reproduction.340 The Attorney General of Quebec submitted that the central purpose of 
the legislation was to regulate the field of reproductive medicine and research.341 Thus 
the federal government maintained that the legislation was a valid exercise of the federal 
criminal law power, while Quebec asserted that the legislation established an illegal 
scheme that regulated matters associated with health concerns that fall under the 
provincial powers.342 
 McLachlin C.J. explained that the purpose of the Act was to prohibit reprehensible 
activities by imposing sanctions. She categorized the Act as a series of prohibitions 
followed by a set of secondary provisions governing their administration.343 Chief Justice 
McLachlin chose to highlight that her colleagues who provided the second opinion in the 
Ref re AHRA believed the legislation had two purposes. This meant that the other judges 
thought the legislation was aimed at prohibiting reprehensible conduct and also 
promoting beneficial practices.344 The dissenting justices claimed that criminal law is 
only concerned with prohibiting undesirable conduct, and does not extend to promoting 
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the beneficial aspects of assisted reproductive technologies.345 However, McLachlin C.J. 
clarified that the Act did not have two purposes, but rather targeted unacceptable conduct 
while incidentally permitting beneficial practices through regulations.346 The regulation 
of positive actions in McLachlin C.J.’s opinion did not make the AHRA 
unconstitutional.347 The central issue was whether or not the AHRA had a dominant 
criminal purpose. In the opinion of McLachlin C.J. the AHRA did in fact have a dominant 
criminal law purpose. Furthermore, one of the goals of criminal legislation is to prohibit 
certain actions in order to achieve desired beneficial effects.348 Therefore, the presence of 
a dominant criminal law purpose enabled the federal government to enact a law that had a 
substantial impact on matters outside of its jurisdiction.349  
 In her effort to establish that the AHRA fell within section 91 (27) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 Chief Justice McLachlin proposed that the legislation fulfilled the 
recognized criteria to qualify as valid criminal law. The established principle related to 
the federal criminal law power was cited in the recent reference opinion entitled Ref re 
Firearms Act (Canada) in 2000. In that reference the Court reiterated the opinion of Rand 
J. who in the Margarine Reference stated that a proper exercise of the federal criminal 
law power must include a prohibition, backed by a penalty, with a criminal law 
purpose.350 McLachlin C.J. stated that the AHRA imposed prohibitions backed by 
appropriate penalties, but some of the provisions did permit certain exceptions. A large 
portion of the legislation was dedicated to the establishment of a regulatory framework. 
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However, McLachlin C.J. was clear in her opinion when she stated that Parliament is 
permitted to create a regulatory scheme under the criminal law power, provided that the 
regulatory structure advances the criminal law objective.351 Additionally, she cited the 
Hydro-Quebec case to communicate that  “The complexity of modern problems often 
requires a nuanced scheme consisting of a mixture of absolute prohibitions, selective 
prohibitions based on regulations, and supporting administrative provisions.”352 The 
established precedent permitted the existence of legislation that creates a regulatory 
framework, and in turn allows flexibility that is vital in changing fields such as the 
environmental policy and assisted reproductive technologies.353  
 McLachlin C.J. was mindful of the Attorney General of Quebec’s objections to 
sections 8 to 13 of the AHRA. She was aware that the Attorney General of Quebec was 
scrutinizing the provisions in a way where the ‘absolute prohibitions’ were separate from 
the ‘controlled activities’ section of the legislation.354 When viewed in this way, the 
Attorney General of Quebec contended that the ‘controlled activities’ category as set out 
in sections 10 to 13 of the Act created a system that was meant to regulate medicine and 
research in the area of assisted reproduction.355 The Attorney General of Quebec went on 
to view sections 8 and 9 through a similar lens.356 In essence, the Attorney General of 
Quebec’s contention was that sections 8 to 13 of the AHRA were in pith and substance an 
attempt to regulate the medical profession and medical research.357 The validity of the 
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Attorney General of Quebec’s argument was reliant upon sections 8 to 13 being 
examined in isolation from the rest of the Act. However, McLachlin C.J. disagreed and 
insisted the Act must be scrutinized within the entire legislative context “which takes into 
account the relationship between the absolute and selective prohibitions, as well as the 
other provisions of the Act.”358 When viewed within the context of the complete 
legislative scheme sections 8 to 13 were directed in pith and substance to be valid 
criminal law objectives.359  
McLachlin C.J. was convinced that assisted reproduction raised significant moral 
concerns. She viewed the Act in its entirety as a legitimate attempt to avoid serious 
damage to the fabric of Canadian society by prohibiting and regulating practices that had 
the potential to devalue human life and degrade participants.360 She continued to reason 
that the Act served a valid criminal law purpose as it was grounded in issues that 
Canadians consider to be of fundamental importance.361 Based upon this logic and the 
topics discussed above, McLachlin C.J. concluded that the legislative scheme instituted 
by the AHRA was not meant to promote positive health measures, but rather to address 
legitimate criminal law matters.362 Therefore, the official opinion of McLachlin C.J. and 
the three others concurring was that the entire Act is valid criminal legislation.363 
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6.4.2 The Joint Reference Opinion of Justices Deschamps and LeBel 
 The crucial difference between Chief Justice McLachlin’s outlook and the second 
opinion of the Ref re AHRA rendered by Justices Deschamps and LeBel, with Justices 
Abella and Rothstein concurring, is demonstrated in the way the judges considered the 
impugned provisions.  The opening paragraph of the Deschamps and LeBel JJ. opinion 
demonstrated the key difference in how the legislation was analyzed. The justices 
proposed that it was incorrect to look at the entire AHRA as one cohesive piece of 
legislation.364 Furthermore, Justices Deschamps and LeBel declared that the appeal 
related “to the connection between certain provisions of the AHR Act [or the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act] and the federal criminal law power.”365  
 The two justices began by reproducing specific sections of the AHRA to determine 
the overall objective Parliament was pursuing when the legislation was enacted. 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. then emphasized how the provisions of the Act were divided 
into two categories; the ‘prohibited activities’ and ‘controlled activities’. In their view the 
provisions under these two separate headings represented two distinct branches of 
activities related to assisted human reproduction.366 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. relied upon 
the final report of the Baird Commission to highlight the fundamental difference that 
existed between the prohibited and controlled activities sections of the AHRA. Citing 
specific statements published in Proceed with Care, the justices conceived “that the 
Commission was of the opinion that assisted reproductive activities and related research 
should be permitted. This means that it considered them morally and socially 
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acceptable.”367 The opinion was developed further when Deschamps and LeBel JJ. 
explained the prohibited activities section of the Act listed dangerous activities and the 
controlled activities contained provisions that benefitted society.  
 Justices Deschamps and LeBel acknowledged that the interpretation they 
provided was vastly different from the justification provided in the first opinion written 
by Chief Justice McLachlin. The judges thought McLachlin C.J. was incorrect when she 
chose to disregard the legislative history of the AHRA in her judicial reasoning.368 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. maintained the standpoint that the legislative history and the 
Baird Commission’s distinctions between prohibited and controlled activities needed to 
be considered when interpreting the goals of the legislation.369 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. 
argued that the difference of opinion occurred because McLachlin C.J. refused to 
consider factors outside the text of the AHRA itself. The justices supported their outlook 
further by citing the opinion of the Quebec Court of Appeal. In essence, the Quebec 
Court of Appeal determined that “the fundamental and dominant purpose of the 
impugned part of the Act is the safeguarding of health and not the elimination of an 
‘evil’.”370  
 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. rejected the Attorney General of Canada’s argument 
that the analysis of the AHRA should be conducted while considering the entire piece of 
legislation. Instead, they believed that the impugned provisions were to be studied 
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separately from the rest of the Act.371 Justices Deschamps and LeBel performed an 
analysis of the impugned provisions considering the stipulations in isolation from the 
remainder of the AHRA.372 In addition, the justices thought it was obvious that the Baird 
Commission wanted to prohibit certain activities and to create a national framework to 
institute uniform guidelines. These standards would apply across Canada and govern 
assisted human reproduction and related research activities.373 The justices reasoned that 
separation of the AHRA into two distinct categories of activities signified that the Baird 
Commission recommended two unique approaches with different purposes.374 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. determined that the way the AHRA was drafted demonstrated a 
clear dichotomy between reprehensible activities and other desirable practices.375 They 
took this as an indication that Parliament accepted the recommendations of the Baird 
Commission when it drafted legislation containing two separate sections with different 
goals.376 
 According to Deschamps and LeBel JJ., expert reports and official parliamentary 
transcripts submitted by the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of 
Quebec suggested the positive perspective of assisted human reproduction in society. The 
justices interpreted these sources as evidence that society did not view assisted 
reproductive technologies as a social ‘evil’, but as a potential solution to reproductive 
problems experienced by a segment of society.377 For these reasons it was postulated that 
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assisted reproductive technologies were regarded as a form of scientific progress that was 
of great value to those with infertility issues.378 Therefore, the justices ascertained that the 
impugned provisions concerning the controlled activities of the AHRA did not have the 
same purpose as sections containing the prohibited activities.379  As a result, Deschamps 
and LeBel JJ. identified that the pith and substance of the impugned provisions was 
characterized as the regulation of assisted human reproduction as a health service.380  
 During Deschamps and LeBel JJ.’s analysis of the federal criminal law power, 
they stated that Rand J.’s reference to an ‘evil’ in the Margarine Reference required the 
evil or threat to be real and legitimate.381 Without this essential interpretation the criminal 
law power would be given unlimited scope and the federal government would have the 
authority under the Constitution to enact laws in any jurisdiction.382 The justices could 
not find any evidence on record to suggest that the controlled activities were to “be 
regarded as conduct that is reprehensible or represents a serious risk to morality, safety or 
public health.”383 Therefore, it was determined that the purpose of the AHRA was not to 
protect individuals from actions that were inherently harmful, but rather to encourage 
medical practice and research that brings benefits to Canadians.384 Deschamps and LeBel 
JJ. warned that if the AHRA was determined to be constitutional it would set a dangerous 
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precedent that would allow the federal government to legislate in every situation 
concerning a new medical technology.385 
 In the opinion of Deschamps and LeBel JJ. the impugned provisions properly fell 
within the domain of provincial jurisdiction. In particular, the provisions related to the 
provinces’ exclusive jurisdiction over hospitals, education, property and civil rights, and 
matters of a merely local nature.386 However, the justices appealed to the principle of 
subsidiarity to continue to give strength to their view. According to the principle 
“legislative action is to be taken by the government that is closest to the citizen and is 
thus considered to be in the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns.”387 They 
continued on to point out that Peter W. Hogg stated the broad interpretation the JCPC 
awarded to the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights could be explained by 
the Council’s acceptance of the principle.388 However, it was unnecessary to rely on the 
principle because the justices claimed there was no doubt that the provisions invaded 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction.389  
 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. began their conclusion by reiterating that “two very 
different aspects of genetic manipulation have been combined in a single piece of 
legislation.”390 The justices declared that the social and ethical concerns of each category 
appeared to be distinct and even divergent.391 Justices Deschamps and LeBel concluded 
“Parliament has therefore made a specious attempt to exercise its criminal law power by 
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merely juxtaposing provisions falling within provincial jurisdiction with others that in 
fact relate to criminal law…”392 Moreover, the regulatory scheme was deemed 
constitutionally invalid because the legislative historical account suggested assisted 
reproduction activities did not connect to criminal law. In other words, Deschamps and 
LeBel JJ. viewed the legislative history of the AHRA and the significant impact the 
impugned provisions had on provincial matters as an attempt by Parliament to enact 
legislation in a matter outside of its jurisdiction.393 All of the reasons listed above led 
Justices Deschamps and LeBel with Justices Abella and Rothstein concurring, to the 
conclusion that the all of the impugned provisions were unconstitutional and should be 
struck down. 
6.4.3 The Deciding Reference Opinion of Justice Cromwell 
 Justice Cromwell was the final Justice who wrote the third and deciding opinion 
of the Ref re AHRA. Cromwell J. was the lone justice who disagreed with the opinions 
rendered by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Deschamps and LeBel.394 Justice 
Cromwell disagreed with McLachlin C.J.’s opinion that the purpose of the legislation was 
to prohibit negative practices associated with assisted reproduction.395 In addition, 
however, Cromwell J. also contended that Deschamps and LeBel JJ’s opinion was too 
narrow. He claimed that the purpose and effect of the legislation was not limited to the 
regulation of assisted human reproduction as a health service.396 He asserted that the 
question in this reference case was “whether the federal criminal law power permits 
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Parliament to regulate virtually all aspects of research and clinical practice in relation to 
assisted human reproduction.”397 Cromwell J.’s opinion differed from those of his 
colleagues because he believed the essence of the impugned provisions went beyond 
prohibiting negative practices and enabled the federal government to minutely regulate 
research and clinical practice.398 Thus, Cromwell J. issued his opinion stating that the 
impugned provisions relate to three areas of provincial jurisdiction.399 The three subjects 
included “the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals; property and 
civil rights in the province; and matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
province.”400 Cromwell J. reasoned that the impugned provisions did not serve a criminal 
law purpose as recognized by the jurisprudence. Furthermore, Cromwell J. agreed with 
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. that the impugned provisions when viewed in isolation did not 
fall under criminal law.401   
 Although Justice Cromwell agreed in part with both of the preceding 
justifications, he needed to supply his judicial reasoning in order to complete the 
Supreme Court’s final opinion of the Ref re AHRA . Justice Cromwell explained which 
provisions within the AHRA were to remain and which sections were to be declared as 
unconstitutional. Unlike Deschamps and LeBel JJ., Justice Cromwell determined that 
some of the impugned provisions were anchored in the federal criminal law power. He 
concluded that sections “8, 9 and 12 in purpose and effect prohibit negative practices 
associated with assisted reproduction and that they fall within the traditional ambit of the 
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federal criminal law power.”402 The constitutional affirmation of section 12 led to 
specific mechanisms that would ensure its implementation being upheld. In sum, 
Cromwell J., supported Chief Justice McLachlin in her opinion to uphold all of the 
prohibited activities set out in the AHRA.403 However, Cromwell J. partly supported the 
opinion supplied by Deschamps and LeBel JJ. This occurred when all of the remaining 
impugned provisions outside of those listed in the absolute prohibitions section of the Act 
were struck down as ultra vires federal jurisdiction.404  
As a result of Justice Cromwell’s deciding opinion in the Ref re AHRA, the 
absolute prohibitions in the AHRA were upheld as criminal law, but the controlled 
activities, licensing and regulatory framework that supported the qualified prohibitions 
were mostly struck down.405 
6.5 Critical Commentary on the Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act 
 Historically, constitutional disputes related to section 91 (27) centred on how to 
define criminal acts. More recently, the focus on the criminal law power has shifted from 
an inquiry to what constitutes a valid criminal law purpose to the judicial interpretation of 
the federal criminal law power’s regulatory function.406 The expanding nature concerning 
the regulatory function of section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was assessed in 
the Ref re AHRA. Previous decisions related to the regulatory function of the federal 
criminal law power in Hydro-Quebec and Reference re Firearms Act (Canada) sustained 
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the establishment of intricate regulatory and licensing regimes under section 91 (27). 
However, the majority opinion in Ref re AHRA “signals that at least a majority of the 
current justices has grown uneasy about an ever-expanding regulatory capacity for the 
criminal law.”407  
The AHRA opens with a broad declaration of principles found in section 2, 
principles that are not typically advanced by the criminal law.408 These principles 
communicated what Parliament was attempting to do with the legislation. In particular, 
the Government of Canada wanted to ensure the health and well-being of children born 
through the application of assisted human reproductive technologies, while protecting 
human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome.409 Recall that 
sections 5 to 7, which contain the absolute prohibitions of the AHRA, such as creation of 
a human clone, creation of an in vitro embryo for purposes other than assisted human 
reproduction, creation of a chimera, or payment for surrogacy or for donation of human 
reproductive material, were not challenged.410 Recall, too, that sections 8, 9 and 12, 
which prohibit the use of human reproductive material or embryos without consent, 
obtaining sperm or ova from a minor except for their own reproductive purposes, and 
reimbursement for donors or surrogates except by the mandatory regulations, were 
challenged but upheld as valid criminal law.411 Finally, sections 10, 11 and 13 banning 
controlled activities such as manipulating, using or storing an in vitro embryo or material 
created through the combination of animal and human matter except in accordance with a 
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license and the regulations, and on a licensed premises, were struck down as ultra vires 
federal jurisdiction.412 
 All of the justices agreed that an essential component of a valid use of the 
criminal law power requires the statute in question to have the purpose of preventing a 
legitimate ‘evil’ or harm. As Chief Justice McLachlin recognized, “The federal criminal 
law power may only be used to prohibit conduct, and may not be employed to promote 
beneficial medical practices.”413 Professor Barbara von Tigerstrom agreed that the 
restriction to the prohibition of conduct is necessary in order to prevent an overly 
expansive interpretation of the criminal law power, but also noted that it is in practice 
challenging to apply this restriction.414 It is difficult to identify the dominant purpose of 
an activity because many actions can have positive and negative effects. To help guide 
the justices to the appropriate judicial opinion the courts rely on judicial precedent. The 
precedent established before the Ref re AHRA in cases like Hydro-Quebec led to the 
belief that there was “considerable scope for future federal legislation aimed at 
controlling activities which put human health at risk, including those which have 
historically been perceived as entirely legitimate in nature.”415 This belief led McLachlin 
C.J. to reason that a regulatory scheme, such as the one established by the AHRA, can be 
characterized as valid criminal law.416 The constitutional pedigree heading into the 
reference suggested that the AHRA had a valid regulatory purpose steeped in 
constitutional precedent.  Peter W. Hogg supported the view of the Chief Justice when he 
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stated “In light of the decided cases, especially Hydro-Quebec, [Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s] opinion seemed to be the correct answer to the constitutional 
question…”417 
 The position of Deschamps and Lebel JJ. appeared to be that since assisted 
reproduction technologies were beneficial and legitimate, then they were not inherently 
harmful or evil and as a result, could not be classified as valid criminal law. von 
Tigerstrom does not believe that it is easy to classify particular actions as “either 
beneficial and legitimate or harmful and reprehensible…”418 I agree with Professor von 
Tigerstrom’s view because it is possible that countless risks can be associated with 
numerous activities even if they are designated as beneficial. If the opinion of Justices 
Deschamps and LeBel suggested that the federal criminal law power cannot be used to 
address such risks, then it would call into question a series of decisions that have 
previously validated this type of federal action.419  
There was a prevailing cautiousness shown by the majority of the Supreme Court 
Justices in the Ref re AHRA. It was apparent that the justices were concerned about the 
intensifying influence of the regulatory function of Parliament’s criminal law power.420 In 
particular, if the regulatory provisions of the AHRA were upheld, it might have allowed 
the federal government to regulate all health care practices under the auspices of the 
criminal law power. I agree with the perspective of John D. Whyte that while the 
Canadian Constitution recognizes certain situations where federal jurisdiction may 
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infringe upon provincial matters, this should not drastically alter the basic constitutional 
balance between the federal and provincial legislative capacities.421 Nonetheless, legal 
scholars have communicated that this wariness on the part of the court concerning the 
AHRA seemed misplaced because “the Courts have repeatedly held, on the contrary [to 
the opinions of Cromwell, Deschamps and LeBel JJ.] that regulatory schemes, including 
partial prohibitions, exemptions, licensing regimes and provisions enabling regulatory 
controls, can also be valid exercises of [the criminal law] power.”422  
In the case of the Ref re AHRA, the trade-off was that the federal government 
would infringe upon provincial jurisdiction to allow for the flexibility of a regulatory 
framework granted in the form of the AHRA. I agree with McLachlin C.J.’s claim that the 
flexibility of a regulatory scheme is essential, particularly when dealing with complex 
and novel subject matter.423 However, Graeme G. Mitchell suspected that if the 
constitutionality of the impugned provisions within the AHRA were sustained then “it 
would mean section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 had truly evolved into the 
general regulatory power for the Parliament of Canada.”424 Consequently, I support von 
Tigerstrom’s observation that, despite the judicial precedent, it appears that the majority 
of the Court was determined to prevent the federal government from playing a significant 
role in a domain traditionally reserved for the provinces.425  
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 Deschamps and LeBel JJ. focused much of their efforts on reviewing the 
legislative history and stressing that the AHRA overlapped with provincial jurisdiction.426 
The fact that the AHRA infringed upon provincial jurisdiction is not determinative in and 
of itself; in addition, the general purpose of the legislation must be considered as well. 
Furthermore, as Barbara von Tigerstrom writes, “their reasons do not analyze the content 
of the various impugned provisions in much detail, and some of what they say about this 
document is not entirely accurate…”427 This observation was supported by Hogg when he 
disagreed with Deschamps and LeBel JJ.’s declaration that the impugned provisions of 
the AHRA attempted to regulate assisted human reproduction as a ‘health service’.428 
Hogg points out that “assisted human reproduction is not a ‘health service’ in any 
obvious sense.”429 It is true that the Act applied to some procedures performed by doctors 
in hospitals for healthy persons seeking assistance to have children.430 The provisions 
within the legislation suggest that the AHRA was meant to regulate highly contentious 
areas that exist outside the relationship of doctors and their patients. For example, the Act 
also applied to scientists, researchers, technicians, laboratories, clinics, sperm banks, 
donors, surrogate mothers, and persons who seek to exploit women and children or who 
seek to profit from selling the means to the artificial creation of life.431 I agree that this 
function of the AHRA as expressed by Hogg highlights that the legislation was not meant 
to only regulate assisted human reproduction as a health service.  
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 Cromwell J.’s deciding opinion emphasized the fractured nature of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s opinion in the Ref re AHRA. Justice Cromwell stated that sections 8 
and 9 of the AHRA were valid criminal law because the issues of consent and age 
traditionally fell within the ambit of criminal law.432 However, von Tigerstrom highlights 
that those same issues have also been closely regulated in the medical sphere by 
provincial legislation.433 Additionally, Cromwell J. maintained the constitutional 
legitimacy of section 12 by saying that it relates to and defines the scope of sections 6 
and 7.434 He compared these provisions with the other impugned sections of the AHRA, 
which he identified as not being “characterized as serving any criminal law purpose 
recognized by the Court’s jurisprudence.”435 I agree with Whyte’s claim that, the short 
length of Cromwell J.’s opinion did not provide a thorough explanation of his position 
and did not explain why he rejected the opinion of McLachlin C.J. that the AHRA was 
created for the purposes of protecting health and morality.436 
 Whyte provided a comment on the Ref re AHRA and listed reasons for the 
constitutional challenge. He argued that the more elaborate the administrative scheme for 
identifying what is criminal, the less prohibitory it is.437 Administrative frameworks 
become more intricate when regulation occurs through an agency that “adopts the 
regulatory instruments of investigation, standard setting through regulations, granting 
licenses and administrative approvals.”438 At the same time the exercise of administrative 
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regulation, when dealing with matters within provincial jurisdiction, will more than likely 
duplicate or interfere with processes of administration the provinces are already engaged 
in.439 Basically, Whyte’s comments clarified that the complexity of the regulatory 
framework as instituted by the AHRA in an area of provincial dominance increased the 
probability that the legislation would not be considered constitutionally legitimate by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.   
 The fractured opinion rendered in the Ref re AHRA has been criticized for failing 
to establish clear guidelines for medical regulation under section 91 (27).440 My view, 
however, is that this criticism misses the mark. On the contrary, I agree with Mitchell’s 
view that the provisions of the AHRA that in fact survived the reference opinion 
demonstrate those actions related to assisted reproduction that fall squarely within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government.441 Consequently, and at least with respect to those 
actions, the Ref re AHRA does set out clear guidelines. Mitchell explains “Prohibitions of 
this kind backed by an offence provision and a penalty clause are the essence of the 
criminal law.”442 Second, the Ref re AHRA does not eliminate the constitutional muster of 
conditional prohibitions created under section 91 (27). This was exemplified when the 
majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA only limited the reach of the controlled activities 
section of the Act and not eliminating the section entirely.443 The judicial precedent 
before the Ref re AHRA suggested that the courts have tolerated extensive regulatory 
regimes provided they were adequately connected to achieving a public health 
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objective.444 I agree with Mitchell when he argued that “The degree of constitutionally 
acceptable medical regulation under the criminal law power is no longer so open-
ended.”445 The Ref re AHRA restored some balance to the enterprise of utilizing section 
91 (27) to justify extensive regulatory schemes in the medical field.446 
 Unfortunately, the majority opinion of the Ref re AHRA does not provide a clear 
example of how to view the minute distinctions present in difficult cases. This is 
enhanced by the absence of a clear majority opinion by the Court. The slim decision drew 
a line regarding the limits of federal legislation relating to health based on the criminal 
law power. The opinion in the Ref re AHRA represents in an area of constitutional law a 
shift from a preoccupation with defining what is properly considered criminal law to 
reviewing the legislation’s regulatory purpose and its effect on provincial jurisdictions in 
order to determine its true constitutional character.447 In other words, this opinion goes 
into a realm not previously supported by the jurisprudence. Although the outcome of the 
Ref re AHRA has been seen as reasonable, the judicial reasoning supporting the opinion 
of the Court did not clarify how to identify distinctions between the federal and 
provincial jurisdictions in such an intricate and evolving policy area.448 The general 
reaction to the ruling of the Court in the Ref re AHRA was that it was unsatisfying 
because of the malleability and uncertainty of the tests employed by the Court regarding 
section 91 (27).449 The drastic changes in legal precedent regarding the development of 
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the federal government’s criminal law power only enhanced this observation. As Patrick 
Monahan and Chanakya Sethi astutely identified, “The case appears to stand for little 
more than the proposition that one should check-in again in the future for the Court’s take 
on the limits of the criminal law power.”450 
I agree with Mitchell’s contention that the majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA 
indicated that the Court is moving away from an unbridled acceptance of the federal 
criminal law power’s regulatory function.451 However, “the close result achieved in [Ref 
re AHRA] means it will be necessary to await other division of powers rulings from the 
Supreme Court to assess whether this judgment does mark a watershed in federalism 
analysis.”452 
7. Implications of the AHRA and Conclusions 
The critical analysis surrounding the Ref re AHRA centred upon the division of 
powers and the latitude of the federal government’s criminal law power as set out in 
section 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These discussions have provided insights 
into the limits of the criminal law power and how the Ref re AHRA may affect subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions. Those who have looked beyond the immediate implications of 
the Ref re AHRA have discussed alternatives to litigation and what the demise of many of 
the AHRA provisions mean for Canada.  
There were a series of factors that contributed to the failure of the impugned 
provisions within the AHRA. During the development of the AHRA the United 
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Kingdom’s status as a world leader in assisted reproductive technology policy, as well as 
its system of parliamentary government, made it the ideal policy lender for Canada.453 
However, unlike Canada the U.K. is a unitary country and its policy initiatives did not 
have to consider the division of powers that are ever-present in a federal system.454 
Regardless of these potential jurisdictional issues Canadian policymakers continued to 
formulate the AHRA based on the laws of the U.K.455 Once the AHRA was finally passed 
in 2004 it was widely considered one of the most comprehensive pieces of reproductive 
technology legislation on the planet.456 The Act consisted of both prohibitions and 
regulations to enforce the provisions contained within. Although the prohibitions were 
considered controversial in terms of policy, there was little doubt that the absolute 
prohibitions fell within the jurisdiction of the federal government.457 This is supported 
further because the constitutionality of the prohibitions was not challenged at the Quebec 
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In comparison, the Act’s regulatory provisions were often seen as infringing upon 
the provincial jurisdiction over healthcare. From the outset opposition party leaders 
expressed their displeasure with the regulatory provisions of the AHRA. Although the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Health in 2001 advocated for a “single 
regulatory regime encompassing one set of standards and one set of penalties… with no 
exceptions”, opposition members continued to question the scope of the AHRA.458 The 
Bloc Quebecois urged co-ordination and co-operation between the federal and provincial 
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governments because large areas of assisted human reproduction fell within provincial 
jurisdiction.459 The Progressive Conservatives aggressively maintained that the provinces 
and territories should be involved in the drafting of the AHRA, while the Canadian 
Alliance expressed the view that without provincial input parts of the legislation would 
be susceptible to constitutional scrutiny.460  
From the beginning numerous political actors warned of the consequences of such 
an intricate piece of federal legislation with little to no provincial participation. After the 
Baird Commission published its final report Proceed with Care, proponents of the AHRA 
grew impatient with constitutional courtesies.461 Diane Marleau, the federal Minister of 
Health during much of the legislative drafting, acknowledged that assisted reproductive 
technologies tended to be in provincial jurisdiction. However, Marleau and other 
supporters of the AHRA felt that assisted reproduction posed controversial questions 
regarding the health of women and well-being of children born as a result of assisted 
reproductive methods.462 The drafters of the Act believed that urgent action was needed in 
order to regulate this field and that suitable regulation could be achieved with the creation 
of one single piece of centralized federal legislation.463 This outlook was reflected in 
Proceed with Care when the Baird Commission rejected the notion that new reproductive 
technologies should continue to be subdivided into component parts and left to the 
provincial legislatures.464 
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By the late 1990’s there was an increased sense of urgency to draft and pass 
legislation related to assisted reproduction. Jones and Salter documented that because of 
how high the stakes had become, the shaping of the AHRA came as a result of numerous 
compromises made by various parties involved in the formulation of the legislation.465 It 
has been widely held that those involved with the AHRA made concessions in order to 
have the Act passed so that there would be some sort of a regulatory framework in place 
related to assisted reproduction technologies.466 The lack of a regulatory framework in 
Canada “was leaving it open for clinicians and researchers to practice, without guidance 
or restriction, those controversial activities which later became prohibited or controlled 
under the Act.”467 Although compromise amongst stakeholders did not come easily, all 
could agree that some sort of a legislative framework was preferred over nothing at all. 
The overriding theme of the legislative process leading up to the passing of the AHRA 
was therefore that many individuals involved with the legislation in a number of 
capacities fast tracked the legislation and ignored the numerous risks related to the 
constitutionality of the Act. As shown in the majority opinion of the Ref re AHRA these 
short cuts proved to be the AHRA’s undoing. 
The result of the Ref re AHRA leaves the regulatory void to be filled by the 
provinces in many areas of assisted reproductive technologies.468 And as Hogg declared, 
“As a matter of policy, the result is unfortunate.”469 It is critical to recognize that at the 
time the Supreme Court of Canada issued its majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA, only 
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one province had enacted a statute to regulate assisted human reproduction.470 The 
Quebec National Assembly passed An Act respecting clinical and research activities 
relating to assisted procreation on June 9, 2009.471 The statute, commonly referred to as 
the Assisted Procreation Act, was passed only after Quebec issued the reference question 
to challenge the federal Act.472 It seems as though the remaining provinces continue to be 
disenchanted with the notion of allocating resources towards the creation of provincial 
legislation concerning assisted reproduction. This observation is supported by Hogg’s 
statement that “None of the other provinces had sought to regulate the field and six 
provinces did not even intervene in the reference.”473 Furthermore, I agree with Hogg’s 
claim that “It seems likely that in some provinces there will be no legislation, and 
therefore no regulatory oversight of practices that may be unsafe for the mother or the 
eventual offspring.”474 Individuals desperate to have biological children may be 
undeterred by these risks and attracted to the provinces that currently or in the future 
offer assisted reproductive services.475 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
ruled out the solution of a comprehensive national regime presented by the federal 
government in the form of the AHRA. All the same, it is possible that the disinterest 
demonstrated by the other provinces may be reduced due to the continued presence of 
Quebec’s assisted reproduction legislation. In other words, the remaining provinces may 
be inspired and use the Quebec statute as a legislative template when drafting their own 
laws related to assisted reproduction. But even this is not guaranteed. For the sun may be 
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setting on Quebec’s Assisted Procreation Act, since as of August 5, 2013 the Minister of 
Health and Social and Services must report to the Quebec provincial legislature regarding 
the implementation of the legislation and on the advisability of maintaining it in force or 
amending it.476  
Regardless of the fate that awaits the Assisted Procreation Act in Quebec the 
federal government deserves some credit for attempting to address the legislative vacuum 
that was present in the field of assisted reproductive technologies prior to the creation of 
the AHRA. Although the scope of the AHRA was severely limited following the majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court some important features remain. Most notably, the absolute 
prohibitions that survived the Ref re AHRA still continue to be enforced by Health 
Canada. These enduring prohibitions will be enforced by Health Canada because the 
Canadian federal government announced that it would oversee the closure of operations 
of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada (AHRC) by March 31, 2013.477  
Some analysts have viewed the closing of the AHRC as a disaster regarding the 
regulation of assisted reproduction legislation.478 In contrast, I agree with Dave Snow and 
Rainer Knopff when they stated “the claim that the Supreme Court ruling created a new 
regulatory void is exaggerated because Assisted Human Reproduction Canada did 
virtually nothing in the way of monitoring or regulation.”479 For example, between April 
2004 and December 2010, only one of the 30 regulations anticipated in the AHRA was 
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introduced by the AHRC.480 Health Canada explained it was delaying the introduction of 
the AHRA regulations because it was awaiting the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Ref re AHRA.481 Also, between 2004 and 2012 there was only one reported 
RCMP investigation into alleged violations of the prohibitions set out in the AHRA.482 As 
for the AHRC’s responsibility to license clinics that perform controlled activities 
stipulated in the AHRA, no fertility clinic was ever granted a license by the AHRC.483 
These examples provide clear evidence that the AHRC failed to promote compliance and 
enforce the provisions of the federal Act. Although, it must be recognized that the 
protracted litigation associated with the AHRA drastically limited the operations of the 
AHRC. Still, the inaction of the AHRC demonstrates how in theory the AHRA had the 
potential to revolutionize assisted reproduction technology policy in Canada, but in 
practice the provisions were under utilized and rendered relatively ineffective. 
With the limitations placed upon the AHRA following the constitutional 
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada it is important to encourage the Canadian 
provinces to draft legislation that regulates assisted reproduction. The majority opinion in 
the Ref re AHRA effectively dismantled Parliament’s unilateral attempt to institute a 
national framework capable of regulating the area of assisted human reproduction. 
However, I agree with Graeme G. Mitchell that it is still possible “to achieve pan-
Canadian standards in the regulation of assisted human reproduction technologies.”484 I 
would propose that inter-governmental co-operation might result in new and innovative 
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ways to address the need for a cohesive national framework. I agree with Mitchell’s view 
that the creation of a unified national scheme would “require forbearance by the federal 
government and a willingness to cooperate by provincial governments.”485 In addition, 
Mitchell advises the provincial governments to address the legislative absence currently 
present in the field of assisted reproduction.486 Again, provinces have been reluctant to 
legislate in this area, but the opinion communicated in the Ref re AHRA should reduce 
this level of cautiousness. Mitchell was correct to warn that if the provinces continue to 
refuse to legislate in this burgeoning and important medical field, the provinces may be 
compelled to act if future cases arise concerning assisted human reproduction that expose 
legislative shortcomings.487 I concur with both Mitchell and Hogg that litigation is a 
protracted and expensive method to attain desired objectives and at times it fails to 
achieve the best policy outcomes.488 Similarly, awaiting directives from the judiciary is 
not only time consuming and expensive, but also is highly inefficient and has the 
propensity to heighten inter-governmental tensions. Anticipating judicial decisions is 
wasteful and removes the accountability of policy choices from the legislatures and 
relocates these decisions into the hands of the judiciary. Abiding by the tenets of co-
operative federalism can potentially eliminate the need for judicial review in some cases, 
keeping policy decisions in the hands of elected officials and away from the appointed 
judiciary.  
The population size and economic capabilities possessed by certain provinces, 
namely Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, may allow these provinces to 
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allocate resources towards the drafting of assisted reproduction technology statutes. 
However, not all provinces may feel they possess the administrative competency to 
adequately regulate the countless issues associated with assisted reproduction. These 
uncertainties should not discourage future attempts to institute a national framework. I 
support the opinion of Mitchell that “There is a way to achieve this goal [of a national 
scheme] which is consistent with the robust concept of co-operative federalism espoused 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent years.”489 Mitchell proposes that the use of the 
co-operative federalism concept can result in administrative inter-delegation. 
Administrative inter-delegation occurs when both levels of government wilfully delegate 
administrative responsibilities to a national agency. In Federation des producteurs de 
volailles du Quebec v. Pelland (2005) it was described that in order for administrative 
inter-delegation to be effective it would require each level of government to enact laws 
and regulations based on “their respective legislative competencies, to create a unified 
and coherent regulatory scheme…”490 Such inter-delegation to a single national agency 
by provincial and the federal governments of their respective jurisdictional powers in 
relation to a particular area of concentration has long been accepted by the Supreme 
Court.491 Once these laws are ratified by each level of government the administration of 
this scheme could be afforded to a single regulatory agency created by Parliament.492  
The Assisted Procreation Act enacted by Quebec is in place and can serve as a 
model for other provinces. The administration of all the provisions contained within each 
potential provincial statute can then be delegated to a single national body responsible for 
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enforcing the national scheme. This arrangement “would permit national standards to be 
achieved yet also take into account local initiatives and values.”493 Although it is true that 
the Ref re AHRA seriously limited the capabilities of the AHRA to regulate sophisticated 
medical technologies, it does not prevent governments from accessing creative yet 
constitutionally acceptable solutions to achieving the formation of a national regulatory 
body responsible for overseeing activities related to assisted reproduction. 
The solutions proposed by Mitchell would be possible if the federal and 
provincial governments were to engage in co-operative federalism. Furthermore, these 
solutions would eliminate the necessity in some situations for governments to appeal to 
the judiciary. But the presence of a legislative vacuum pushed policymakers to draft a 
constitutionally precarious piece of legislation. The threat of a legislative vacuum in such 
a controversial and evolving policy domain may have caused the legislative drafters to 
overlook the value that inter-governmental co-operation could have brought to the AHRA. 
This may have been because the policy makers did not believe that the provinces were 
willing or capable of reaching an agreement on an issue that was morally, socially, and 
politically controversial in nature. As highlighted above, opposition members frequently 
endorsed co-ordination between governments. The result of the Ref re AHRA proved that 
the constitutional gamble taken by those involved in the creation of AHRA did not pay 
off. Various political figures, academics and commentators writing both before and after 
the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in the Ref re AHRA discussed the enormous value 
inter-governmental co-operation could bestow upon the Act.   
                                                          
493
 Mitchell, supra note 296 at 670. 
104 
 
Recall that at the core of co-operative federalism is a network of relationships that 
exist between the executives of the central and regional governments. Through these 
relationships inter-governmental mechanisms are created which allow for the constant 
redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts or constitutional 
amendment. The development of the AHRA and the subsequent judicial saga culminating 
in the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority opinion in the Ref re AHRA is an example of 
political actors failing to adhere to the tenets of co-operative federalism. In this situation, 
both the federal and provincial governments failed to abide by the principles of co-
operative federalism therefore both levels of government must shoulder some of the 
blame. Contrary to the views of the opposition parties, it seems the federal government 
did not adequately consult the provinces while the AHRA was being developed.494 
Moreover, the prolonged litigation process was initiated by the Government of Quebec 
and the decision to appeal to the judiciary contravened the primary goals of co-operative 
federalism. Regardless of the legislative vacuum being addressed with the passing of the 
AHRA, I would suggest that the Act was seen as expendable by Quebec, especially once 
the Assisted Procreation Act was being drafted and on its way to being passed. 
Furthermore, Quebec’s political leaders may have viewed assisted reproduction as a topic 
that was on the fringes of society’s central social and economic concerns. As a result, the 
Quebec government may have thought that laws drafted in the provincial legislature 
would adequately address any perceived concerns related to assisted human reproduction 
legislation. In sum, it appears the province of Quebec did not share the same sentiments 
of the federal government that viewed the AHRA as an indispensable piece of health 
legislation.  
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Numerous academics and legal commentators have endorsed the concept of co-
operative federalism as an option to adequately regulate assisted human reproductive 
technologies. This would suggest that in this case there is scholarly support for promoting 
co-operative federalism as an efficient substitute for judicial review. That is not to say 
that the involvement of the judiciary is not valuable, as in some cases litigation is 
unavoidable. The reality is that in some situations there may not be an agreement that can 
be reached between governments. However, I would argue that when possible, appeals to 
the judiciary should be considered only if extended inter-governmental negotiations are 
unsuccessful. Greater inter-governmental negotiation and consultation is needed when 
creating complex policy in an emerging field like assisted human reproduction. I endorse 
the notion that if inter-governmental interactions were to abide by the tenets of co-
operative federalism legislation would be less susceptible to the long and expensive 
process of judicial review. In other words, if there is greater inter-governmental 
negotiation through the utilization of co-operative federalism during the drafting of 
legislation it is possible that laws can be endorsed by both levels of government. More 
consultation may lead to statutes that are accepted by both levels of government and thus 
less likely to be constitutionally challenged. This notion of laws being supported by both 
levels of government is at the centre of both co-operative federalism and its counter-part 
competitive federalism. Regardless, both concepts attempted to achieve the same goal 
albeit through different methods. The objective was to introduce a framework that would 
allow statutes to be supported by both levels of government.  
In the end, many lessons can be learned from the failings of the AHRA if one 
heeds the advice of the Supreme Court of Canada, various legal commentators and 
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constitutional scholars. My view is that a possible solution to the difficulties encountered 
during the legislative saga surrounding the AHRA is greater inter-governmental co-
ordination, consultation and negotiation as endorsed by the concept of co-operative 
federalism. In addition, I would go so far as to say that the applicability of the concept 
transcends this case and can be applied to others. As demonstrated throughout this project 
inter-governmental co-operative interaction – that is, co-operative federalism – makes it 
possible for governments to utilize creative constitutional processes such as 
administrative inter-delegation to achieve complex policy objectives including a national 
regulatory framework. Furthermore, it is possible to avoid unnecessary litigation, create 
widely accepted legislation and minimize inter-governmental tensions through the use of 
co-operative federalism. In the end, then, within the confines of Canada’s current 
constitutional structure, co-operative federalism is the best way to manage tensions and 
increase efficiency within the Canadian Federation, while negating the presence of 
unnecessary litigation before the courts. 
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